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Abstract
Antitrust law has long been mindful of the danger that firms may misuse their patents to
facilitate price fixing. Courts and commentators addressing this danger have assumed that
patent-facilitated price fixing occurs in a single market. In this Article, we extend
conventional analysis to address firms’ patent misuse to facilitate price fixing across
multiple products lines. By doing so, we expose gaps in existing agency enforcement and
scholarly proposals for reform. Important legal tests that make sense in the single market
setting do not carry over to the context we call serial collusion, where certain offenders
engage in repeat collusion across product lines. This Article argues that there is an urgent
need to recast these tests to address serial collusion of the sort that prevails in the
chemicals, auto parts and electronics industries. To support this argument, we develop
empirical evidence consistent with the possibility that serial colluders in the chemical
industry acquired and used patents to support their collusion, either directly to coordinate
and monitor output and pricing or indirectly to deter new firm entry by erecting patent
thickets as a barrier to entry. Throughout this Article, we describe the flaws of current
antitrust doctrine when it comes to assessing patents and price fixing, suggest doctrinal
improvements, and provide guidance to antitrust enforcers about how to better understand
and combat serial collusion facilitated by patents.
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INTRODUCTION
In the history of antitrust enforcement, patents have occupied center stage in a number
of Supreme Court cases addressing horizontal price fixing and conspiracies to
monopolize. 4 As one eminent economist has observed, “some of the worst price fixing
schemes in American history were erected on a foundation of agreements to cross-license
4

Notable examples include United States v. Singer Manufacturing Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963); United
States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371 (1952); United States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948); United
States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948); Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 324 U.S. 570 (1945);
Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931).
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complementary and competing patents.” 5 Over forty years ago, a formative study by
George Priest identified the collusive potential of patent licenses. Priest described how a
patent owner might, through licensing agreements with rivals, create a cartel:
The Patent Act, as interpreted by the courts, has allowed persons granted or
assigned patents broad authority to set licensee output, to allocate licensee
territories, and even to fix minimum licensee prices. This has meant that a
group of firms agreeing, in violation of the Sherman Act, either to fix prices
or allocate output, could disguise its agreement by obtaining a patent on an
unimportant process and executing licenses to previously competing
members which incorporate the provisions of the illegal agreement. 6
In essence, a patent holder, who can control output and thus affect prices for products that
make use of its invention, could become a ring leader for a cartel under the cover of
organizing a patent licensing scheme.
Early in the twentieth century, courts struggled to characterize patent licenses and pools
that increased patent-based profits by restraining market competition. The recent FTC v.
Actavis, Inc. decision recalled this body of law and noted: “[United States v. Line Material
Co.] explained that ‘the improper use of [a patent] monopoly,’ is ‘invalid’ under the
antitrust laws and resolved the antitrust question in that case by seeking an accommodation
‘between the lawful restraint on trade of the patent monopoly and the illegal restraint
prohibited broadly by the Sherman Act.’” 7 Courts were generally deferential to patent

5

FREDERIC M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 452 (2d
ed. 1980). See also Irene Till, The Legal Monopoly, in THE MONOPOLY MAKERS: RALPH NADER’S STUDY
GROUP REPORT ON REGULATION AND COMPETITION 289, 307 (Mark J. Green ed., 1973) (“Harnessed to serve
the ends of corporate enterprise, the patent has become a potent instrument for restraint of trade.”).
6
George L. Priest, Cartels and Patent License Arrangements, 20 J.L. & ECON. 309, 309 (1977).
Other commentators from this period who identified the collusive possibilities posed by patent licensing
agreements include LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 551–54 (1977)
[hereinafter HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST]; Till, supra note 5, at 310 (“Licensing agreements have
contained production and marketing quotas for licensees. Directly or indirectly they have served as vehicles
for setting prices and establishing limited market territories . . . .”); William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on
Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 336 (1966) (observing that
price restrictions in patent licensing agreements can constitute “the backbone of a loose-knit cartel”).
7

570 U.S. 136, 148 (2013) (citing Line Material, 333 U.S. at 310).
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licensing schemes so long as they were confined to the duration of the patent agreement
and did not involve products beyond the patented product. 8
In the years between Line Material 9 and recent pay-for-delay cases, government
antitrust agencies have detected and prosecuted several thousand price-fixing
agreements. 10 Yet, judicial decisions, enforcement agency statements, and other accounts
of these agreements rarely mention patents. This absence puzzles us. One possible reason
is that judicial opinions and enforcement agency guidance, especially from the 1930s
through the 1970s, discouraged price-fixers from using patents to advance their goals. 11
The wariness of antitrust policy concerning patent licensing practices crested in the late
1970s with the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) issuance of what became known as the “Nine
No-Nos”—a set of licensing practices that the Antitrust Division would regard as per se
illegal violations of the Sherman Act. 12 In response, companies perhaps worried that
restrictive patent license terms would elicit enforcement agency scrutiny and avoided using
patents for collusive ends. Few major antitrust cases involving price fixing and patents
came before the Supreme Court from the 1970s to 2000s, until the eyes of the antitrust

8

See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33–34 (1964) (ruling that a contract requiring the licensee
to pay royalties to the licensor after the licensed patent had expired was patent misuse); see also Kimble v.
Marvel Ent., LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 465 (2015) (reaffirming principle of Brulotte). The most contentious and
often revisited issue in this period involved United States v. General Electric, Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926),
where the Supreme Court validated a licensing term by which the licensor set the price of the licensee’s
output from the application of the licensed patent. See infra notes 100–04 (discussing judicial reconsideration
of General Electric).
9

333 U.S. 287 (1948).

10
The Workload Reports prepared by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) for
fiscal years 1960 through 2019 indicate that the DOJ initiated nearly 2,800 criminal cases alleging violations
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. See Division Operations, DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/atr/divisionoperations (last accessed May 13, 2021) (providing downloadable workload statistics regarding agency
enforcement actions by primary type of conduct at issue). Most of these matters involved horizontal price
fixing or agreements among competitors to allocate customers or sales territories. See id.
11

ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN
COMPETITION POLICY 1111–22 (3d ed. 2017).
12

Id. at 1112. In 1995, the federal antitrust agencies issued guidelines that retreated significantly
from the positions staked out in the “Nine No-Nos.” Id. at 1122–23.

4
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world turned to pay-for-delay agreements in the pharmaceutical context between makers
of branded and generic drugs in Actavis. 13
In this Article, we offer a different conjecture. Focusing on the rampant price fixing in
the chemical industry from 1980 to present as a case study, 14 we contend that patents
probably still do play a significant role in price fixing—a role that has gone unnoticed by
enforcers. Our extensive examination of serial collusion in the chemical industry and our
empirical evidence of patenting practices by collusive chemical firms leads us to this
conclusion. Instead, patents are probably an important device to help manage and maintain
cartels, especially among serial colluders, as described in greater detail below.
In a recent article on price fixing, we coined the term “serial colluder” to designate
multi-product firms that have participated in many cartels, involving a range of
participants, and initiated at different dates. 15 Several chemical firms meet this definition
because of their participation in at least thirty different chemical cartels spanning at least
three decades. 16 Our earlier article also addressed the business model of serial colluders
and the failure of anti-cartel law to deter such behavior. In some cases, weak monitoring
and high-powered incentive payments to product division managers may have fostered
multiple cartels without encouragement from, or even contrary to the instructions of, upper
management. This “rogue manager” explanation of serial collusion is often invoked by
corporate directors seeking a story that deflects blame away from them. A more troubling
explanation for serial collusion is that price fixing is an integral part of the business model
of certain firms, and high-level managers advocate for and assist with collusion throughout
13

Pay-for-delay cases involve agreements between producers of branded, patented pharmaceutical
products and generic entrants that keep a competing—and allegedly infringing—generic product from
entering the market. GAVIL ET AL., supra note 11, at 1161–79. These cases present difficult characterization
questions, and courts have struggled to decide whether these agreements are per se illegal instances of price
fixing, per se lawful and socially desirable uses of patents, or, as the Supreme Court recently concluded in
FTC v. Actavis, something in a middle ground that should be evaluated under the rule of reason. 570 U.S.
136 (2013); Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason in the Post-Actavis World, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
25 (2018).
14

William E. Kovacic et al., Serial Collusion by Multi-Product Firms, 6 J. ANTITRUST ENF’T 296
(2018) [hereinafter Serial Collusion]; Robert C. Marshall, Unobserved Collusion: Warning Signs and
Concerns, 5 J. ANTITRUST ENF’T 329 (2017) [hereinafter Unobserved Collusion]. In this Article we refer to
these works as our “prequel papers.”
15

Note that a firm could be a recidivist but not a serial colluder, and that a serial colluder does not
need to be a recidivist.
16

Serial Collusion, supra note 14, at 301–13.
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the firm. We believe serial colluders in certain industries have run “portfolios of cartels.”
In support of this “business model” explanation, in previous work we presented various
kinds of indirect evidence that serial colluders in the chemical industry have indeed run a
portfolio of cartels. 17 Unaddressed in that previous work is an examination of how serial
colluders may use patents and patent licensing schemes to initiate or maintain a cartel.
In Section I of this paper, we find that serial colluders increased patenting during the
duration of their cartels, which is consistent with the theory that these firms use new patents
to support cartelization. The magnitude of this increase is above and beyond incremental
increases in patenting over time. We also find that “core” serial colluders (but not other
major serial colluding chemical firms) increased patenting on products that they did not
produce but that were being cartelized by their fellow colluders, which is consistent with
the view that serial colluders engage in reciprocal practices across distinct markets. 18 On
the whole, our analysis of patenting practices for serial colluders in the chemical space
suggests ongoing use of patents to initiate or maintain cartels, a practice that may apply to
other industries with serial colluders as well.
Finding that the empirical data support our hypothesis of serial colluders using patents
to create and maintain cartels, we next probe in Sections II and III reasons for why this
conduct might evade agency enforcement and effectively help to coordinate cartels. Unlike
the older cartels that openly used patents to directly restrain output, modern serial colluders
running a portfolio of cartels potentially use patents in ways that are indirect and less likely
to be noticed by private plaintiffs and government enforcers. We then explore how cartel
participants in the modern era (excepting pay-for-delay cases like Actavis) appear to use
patents to deter entry into cartelized markets, facilitate intrafirm communications and
actions in support of collusive conduct, and communicate with other serial colluders about
their portfolio of cartels under the guise of discussing their portfolio of patent licenses.
For the remainder of the Article, we discuss how the existing antitrust
jurisprudence regarding patents and price fixing requires major upgrades to account for the

17

This evidence will be reviewed in Section III.B.

18

A firm is identified as a non-producer if the relevant European Commission Prohibition Decision
(EC decision) did not identify the firm as a producer. If the firm produced the product exclusively for internal
consumption or made the product but only sold it outside of the European Union, then we would still label
the firm as a non-producer.

6
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dramatic modern improvements in our understanding of the economics of collusion. In
older cases, judges recognized that firms could use patent licenses directly to restrict
output, raise prices, or boost competitors’ marginal costs, 19 but they may not have
appreciated the many indirect ways that patents can increase cartel stability and
profitability. As discussed in greater detail below, patents provide an avenue for ongoing
communication among rivals about output and pricing. Patent pools and cross-licensing
arrangements are especially useful for organizing cartels across product types.
Furthermore, licensing regimes may permit a firm to organize supportive resources within
the firm without raising legal compliance concerns.
Anticipating these benefits to cartel formation and maintenance, this Article goes
on to suggest that serial colluders may engage in strategic patenting. That is, they procure
patents to advance cartel goals rather than to promote innovation. We present data on global
patent procurement by price fixers in the chemical industry that is consistent with this view.
Importantly, firms managing a portfolio of cartels can use patents in a reciprocal way to
stabilize cartels across markets where not all firms participate as producers in each market.
Within the network of chemical cartels, for example, we see evidence that certain firms use
patents to promote cartels in markets for products they do not produce. Firms may use the
threat of a patent lawsuit to punish deviators and discourage outsiders from attempting to
enter a cartelized market. They may also use patent licenses to audit licensee sales and
monitor compliance with cartel rules. One firm might perform such a service for other
firms in the collusive network with the expectation that the non-participant would get
similar help managing their own portfolio of cartels from other serial colluders in the
future.
Further, in this Article, we probe deeply into the ways serial colluders can
coordinate their patent practices to enhance cartel profits and stabilize their cartels. Our
previous work on serial collusion documented that modern anti-collusion enforcement has
not adequately deterred massive, prolonged multi-market price-fixing schemes. 20 We also

19

See Section III.A’s discussion of Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 238 U.S. 163
(1931), Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945), and E. Bement and Sons v. National
Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902).
20

Serial Collusion, supra note 14, at 297–301.
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explained how various forms of reciprocity among serial colluders increased their cartel
profits and made cartels more resilient. 21 We expand on this topic with respect to the use
of patents for cartelization, which we touched on only briefly in previous work.
This Article also describes gaps in existing antitrust enforcement and scholarly
analysis of patenting practices. Recognition of serial collusion helps us to identify further
flaws in the conventional treatment of patent licenses that allegedly facilitate price fixing.
As one example, case law favors vertical patent licenses by applying rule of reason analysis
to restrictions that could earn per se condemnation if organized as horizontal licenses. 22
Such deference stems partly from worries that anti-collusion enforcement could weaken
returns to patents and discourage research and innovation, as well as concerns that there
may be legitimate reasons for suppliers, manufacturers, retailers to coordinate some
activities. Yet, past practice of serial colluders show that firms can and do evade per se
condemnation by simply organizing a middle man to stand as an upstream patent pool
organizer. Thus, we reject such deference for vertically organized patent licenses in the
context of serial colluders that are managing a portfolio of cartels, because what appears to
be a vertical relationship is often part of the network of connections among serial colluders.
Similarly, the leading scholarly commentary on patents and price fixing suggests that
socially desirable licenses can be sorted from socially harmful licenses by determining
whether significant rents flow to the licensor. 23 This test may be effective in the context of
an isolated cartel affecting a single market. 24 As we explain in Section IV, this test has little
or no value in the context of serial collusion where the firms are managing a portfolio of
cartels.
Finally, in this Article, we provide additional policy recommendations tailored to
the abuse of patents by serial colluders. Our earlier work lays out various reforms to anticollusion policy that could mitigate the harms of serial collusion. In Section V, we go
21

Serial colluders can respond to shocks that might destabilize their cartels by adjusting rewards to
members via subcontracting agreements, sales of plants or divisions from one member to another, or even by
coordinated entry into a market by one firm and exit by another. Id. at 330–34.
22

ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, Antitrust Issues Involving Intellectual Property, ANTITRUST
LAW DEVELOPMENTS, vol. 2, ch. 11, at 1107–10 (8th ed. 2017) [hereinafter ANTITRUST LAW
DEVELOPMENTS] (discussing treatment of customer, territorial, and field of use restrictions).
23

Priest, supra note 6.

24

Id.
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further and explain how certain patent-related behaviors by firms that do not participate
directly in cartelizing a particular market can be used to infer collusion in that market (when
the outsider is part of a network of serial colluders). We also discuss penalties and liability
that antitrust and patent agencies should impose on firms that use their patents to facilitate
collusion by others. Specifically, we argue for generous application of the patent misuse
defense to render unenforceable patents used to facilitate price fixing. 25 Entry would be
easier and patent-based cartel punishments would be eliminated if cartel patents are left
unenforceable. Finally, we identify possible adjustments in the institutional arrangements
by which the federal antitrust enforcement agencies address the use of patents and patent
licensing to facilitate collusion.
This Article is organized as follows. Section I presents empirical evidence that serial
collusion is a serious problem, that serial colluders in the chemical industry use the patent
system intensively in ways that suggest strategic patenting, and that their patenting
behavior is consistent with their use of patents to enhance multi-market price fixing.
Section II considers the evolution of antitrust doctrine and policy related to patent assertion
and licensing as collusive devices. Notwithstanding existing strictures, this section reviews
how patent practices can facilitate cartelization. Section III turns to the role that patents can
play in supporting serial collusion. Section IV discusses the modernization of doctrines
related to patents and price fixing in response to the threat of serial collusion. Section V
offers policy recommendations and additional concluding comments.
I.

SERIAL COLLUSION AND PATENTS: CASE STUDY IN THE GLOBAL
CHEMICAL INDUSTRY
Serial collusion in the chemical industry dates back to the 1880s and has reappeared

in most decades since then. 26 German chemical firms have been prominent price-fixers

25

See infra Section V; see also Daryl Lim, Revisiting the Patent Misuse Doctrine: Its Potential
Contribution to Maintaining Incentives for Innovation, in INNOVATION SOC’Y & INTELL. PROP. 188 (Josef
Drexl & Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2019) [hereinafter Revisiting Patent Misuse] (setting out the
patent misuse doctrine and discussing possible procompetitive applications in antitrust law).
26
Serial Collusion, supra note 14, at 312–13. See also Diarmuid Jeffreys, HELL’S CARTEL: IG
FARBEN AND THE MAKING OF HITLER’S WAR MACHINE (2010) (documenting the role that German chemical
industry cartels played to support Nazi Germany’s war mobilization efforts in the 1930s and German military
production during World War II); Heinrich Kronstein, The Dynamics of German Cartels and Patents. I, 9 U.
CHI. L. REV. 643 (1942) [hereinafter Dynamics of German Cartels] (discussing cartelization in Germany

9
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and often cartel ring-leaders, but they have been joined by chemical firms from the
United States, England, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Canada, Switzerland, South
Korea, and Japan. 27 Dozens of different chemical products have been affected by price
fixing at some point. 28 Historically, some of these collusive agreements were regional;
others were global. Some were short-lived; others spanned decades. This history, and the
specific role of patents to instituting and maintaining cartels in the global chemicals
market, is described below.
A. Historical and Modern Cartelization of the Global Chemical Industry
Patents played a significant role in chemical cartels during the first half of the
twentieth century. 29 Margaret Levenstein observes that “[d]uring most of the 30 years
preceding World War I, bromine producers in the United States and Europe colluded,
pooling output, dividing up markets, and raising prices.” 30 In the period leading up to
World War II, German chemical firms engaged in a variety of practices that Heinrich
Kronstein has called “monopolizing by patents.” 31 One technique employed by the
“combine” of chemical companies was to direct the research arm of each participant to

from late nineteenth century through mid-twentieth century and analyzing role of patents in facilitating
cartelization).
27
The firms listed in Figure 1, infra, were based in Germany, England, France, Belgium, and the
Netherlands during the periods of collusion. American, South Korean, and Japanese firms participated in the
lysine cartel; American, Swiss, German, Canadian, and Japanese firms participated in the vitamins cartel;
American, Swiss, German, and Dutch firms participated in the citric acid cartel, Dutch, Japanese and French
firms participated in the sodium gluconate cartel; and American, German, and Japanese firms participated in
the sorbates cartel. DEP’T JUST., Appendix A: Antitrust Division Selected Criminal Cases, April 1, 1996
through September 30, 1999, https://www.justice.gov/atr/selected-criminal-cases-antitrust-division (last
accessed June 8, 2021).
28

Serial Collusion, supra note 14, at 308 fig.5, 312–13.

29

WYATT WELLS, ANTITRUST AND THE FORMATION OF THE POSTWAR WORLD 12–26 (2002)
[hereinafter FORMATION OF THE POSTWAR WORLD]. In discussing the durability of German cartels in the steel
and chemicals sector from the 1880s to World War II, Wells observes that German cartel participants were
also “adept at cloaking domestic and even international cartels in the guise of patent agreements, the violation
of which also entailed considerable legal risks.” Id. at 13. See also GEORGE W. STOCKING & MYRON W.
WATKINS, CARTELS IN ACTION: CASE STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DIPLOMACY 363–517 (1946)
[hereinafter CARTELS IN ACTION] (recounting the role that patent licensing practices played in the formation
and operation of chemical industry cartels involving German firms and, in many instances, foreign
producers).
30

Margaret C. Levenstein, Do Price Wars Facilitate Collusion? A Study of the Bromine Cartel
Before World War I, 33 EXPLS. ECON. HIST. 107, 107 (1996).
31

Dynamics of German Cartels, supra note 26, at 664.
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procure as many patents as possible, to use them for strategic ends. 32 From his study of
patents and cartelization in 1920s Germany, Kronstein reported that “[m]ore and more the
chemical industry began to apply for patents on practically everything. The research
laboratories of the few remaining chemical works, connected among themselves by cartel
and working agreements, systematically studied entire fields and closed them by a large
number of patents.” 33 In fields such as plastics and pharmaceuticals, “[e]ach publication in
any chemical review or each patent application of any applicant in any country was given
to the staff of the research laboratory to find anything that could be patented, no matter if
the patent was a patent of evasion or supplement or protection against other inventors.” 34
This phenomenon Kronstein described resembles the pattern of recent patenting behavior
in the chemical sector we document below—where patenting activity by cartel participants
increases dramatically during the period of illegal collaboration for the purpose of
consolidating market share for existing firms and keeping out entrants. 35
A second method documented by Kronstein and other researchers involves the
extensive use of patent licensing agreements among major U.S. and foreign chemical
producers and their subsidiaries to establish effective networks for global cartelization.36
Kronstein reports that in the decades leading up to World War II, “[t]he participation of an
American enterprise in a world cartel chiefly through the device of patent exchange became
very common.” 37 In 1946, George Stocking and Myron Watkins reported “that a division
of market territories for products coming within the scope of [cartel] patents and secret
processes in a given field usually entail[ed] a complete division of territories for all related
products.” 38

32

Stocking and Watkins share this view with respect to the chemical patent practices of I.G. Farben.
See CARTELS IN ACTION, supra note 29, at 373 n.16.
33

Dynamics of German Cartels, supra note 26, at 664.

34

Id. Kronstein used the term “patent of evasion” to describe patents that sought to work around an
existing patent to “accomplish[] the same result as a previous patent of another patentee without infringing
it.” Id. at 664 n.65.
35

See id.

36

Dynamics of German Cartels, supra note 26, at 668–71.

37

Id. at 669.

38

CARTELS IN ACTION, supra note 29, at 428. American firms in the dyestuffs cartel used patent
licenses to stabilize their cartel. Id. at 509. Dupont and Nobel used patent licenses to facilitate the explosives
cartel. Id. at 439. General Electric engaged its foreign counterparts in similar agreements to cartelize the

11
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A third method of cartelization involved the use of multiple licensing arrangements to
cartelize entire domestic markets. In the late 1930s, the DOJ successfully challenged Ethyl
Gasoline Company for creating an elaborate system of licensing arrangements for the
production and use of tetra-ethyl lead to stabilize prices for motor fuel. 39 In another
prominent American example of the technique applied outside the chemical sector, in the
1940s, the DOJ prosecuted United States Gypsum for using minimum price terms in patent
licenses to cartelize the gypsum wallboard industry. 40 For about a decade, Gypsum had
granted licenses with largely identical price restrictions to nearly all of the industry’s
numerous firms. 41 In upholding the government’s challenge to Gypsum’s licensing terms,
the Supreme Court observed, “the industry is completely regimented, the production of
competitive unpatented products suppressed, a class of distributors squeezed out, and
prices on unpatented products stabilized.” 42
The rash of chemical industry cartelization has continued to modern times. In the three
decades since 1980, the European Commission (EC) prosecuted chemical producers for
collusion in 32 separate markets. 43 Notable American antitrust cases brought against
chemical producers during this period ended cartels in the markets for lysine, citric acid,
and vitamin C. 44 Since 2010, the Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) fined
production of light bulbs, as did Standard Oil of New Jersey in the hydrogenation of coal into petroleum.
Dynamics of German Cartels, supra note 26, at 669–70.
39

Ethyl Gasoline Co. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940). The Supreme Court observed that Ethyl
“has established the marketing of the patented fuel in vast amounts on a nationwide scale through the 11,000
jobbers and, at the same time, by the leverage of its licensing contracts resting on the fulcrum of its patents,
it has built up a combination capable of use, and actually used, as a means of controlling jobbers’ prices and
suppressing competition among them.” Id. at 457.
40

United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948).

41

Id. at 371–86.

42

Id. at 400. In later years, the DOJ twice prosecuted firms in the U.S. gypsum industry of price
fixing. In United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978), the defendants defeated charges
of price fixing based on price information exchanges within the industry. More recently, three American
drywall manufacturers settled charges of price fixing in 2012 and 2013. See Press Release, Berger &
Montague, P.C., $125 Million Settlement Reached in Drywall Price-Fixing Lawsuit, MKTS. INSIDER (Jan. 3,
2018, 4:40 PM), https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/125-million-settlement-reached-indrywall-price-fixing-lawsuit-1012446943.
43

The chemical industry is a good candidate for stable price-fixing agreements. In many markets
there few producers, products are usually homogeneous, and the long history of cooperative pricing fosters
trust among colluding firms.
44

The citric acid cartel is discussed in John M. Connor, What Can We Learn from the ADM Global
Price Conspiracies? (Purdue Univ. Dep’t Agri. Econ., Staff Paper #98-14, Aug. 1998),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227645450. The lysine cartel is discussed in John M. Connor,
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participants in a chemical additives cartel. 45 Today, the EC is investigating an ethylene
cartel, 46 and a massive investigation of serial collusion by generic drug companies is
ongoing in the United States. 47 Whereas the scope of these investigations has not focused
on what role patents may have played in helping to facilitate these cartels, we suspect that
patents did play a role. 48 We explore this conjecture by examining the patenting behavior
of colluding firms before, during, and after agency enforcement to explore whether these
firms may have pursued patents for strategic ends.
B. Empirical Analysis of Serial Collusion in the Global Chemical Markets, 1980s
to Present: The Role of Strategic Patenting to Facilitate Cartelization
Our analysis of strategic patenting in the global chemicals markets starts with the
information on serial collusion in chemical markets displayed in Figures 1 and 2. The
companies listed in the rows are all European chemical producers, 49 except for the Swiss
consulting firm Fides/AC Treuhand. The columns list the different chemicals that the EC
found to be cartelized in the period 1980 to present, from EC Prohibition Decisions (EC
decisions) listed in Appendix A. Subsequent graphs replace the chemical names with the
“Our Customers are Our Enemies”: The Lysine Cartel of 1992–1995, 18 REV. IND. ORG. 5, 10 (2001)
[hereinafter Lysine Cartel]. The Vitamin C cartel is discussed in Mitsuru Igami & Takuo Sugaya, MEASURING
INCENTIVE TO COLLUDE: THE VITAMIN CARTELS, 1990-1999 (Mar. 7, 2017),
THE
http://economics.mit.edu/files/12734.
45
See, e.g., KOREAN FAIR TRADE COMM’N, Korea Fair Trade Commission Imposes Sanctions
against Detected Cases of Collusion in Chemical Additives Essential for Plastic Products (November 21,
2014),
http://www.ftc.go.kr/solution/skin/doc.html?fn=ea8619c859a43bfca52257aaf1c0fed13159d5768ec671b5d1
0b363dba0967b3&rs=/fileupload/data/result/BBSMSTR_000000002402/ (imposing sanctions and fines
against five producers of chemical additives for plastic products due to price and quantity collusion between
2002 and 2013).
46

Margaret Volkova, Celanese Reserves USD88 Million Related to European Commission Ethylene
Cartel Investigation, MKT. REP. CO. (Dec. 26, 2019), http://www.mrcplast.com/news-news_open363613.html.
47
DEP’T
JUST.,
Antitrust
Division
Update
2020:
Generic
Drugs,
https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-operations/antitrust-division-update-2020/generic-drugs (last updated
June 23, 2020).
48
One exception is lysine. Lysine Cartel, supra note 44, at 10. Archer Daniels Midland (ADM)
entered the lysine market even though Ajinomoto held patents on manufacturing techniques. Connor’s
account of testimony at the ADM price fixing trial indicates that “Ajinomoto believed that ADM had stolen
its patented lysine microorganisms, and the trial transcript makes clear that ADM did attempt to steal lysine
secrets from Ajinomoto.” Id. He adds that “Ajinomoto had filed a patent-infringement suit against ADM
concerning the amino acid threonine (which Ajinomoto won).” Id. at 12 n.10.
49

American, Japanese, and Korean chemical firms also were involved in price fixing during this
period. See Lysine Cartel, supra note 44, at 7–12 (discussing membership of lysine cartel).
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number listed below each chemical, as identified in Appendix A. The grey color in a box
indicates that the firm participated in a cartel for that chemical market, as determined from
EC decisions as well. All of these decisions are listed in Appendix A by chemical name.
These cartels had different start dates, end dates, and durations; some cartels operated for
as long as 30 years. 50 The duration of each cartel is displayed in Figure 2. 51
Next, for each of the chemical producers subject to EC decisions listed in Figure 1, we
studied patenting activity near to the time of the relevant cartel. 52 We first counted global
patent applications 53 that were ultimately granted for each of the firm-participants to a
cartel during that cartel’s active period, 54 determined from the relevant EC decision and
labeled as the “plea period.” We then tallied patenting in the 10 years before and after the
plea period in order to analyze trends in patenting for these firms. Since the length of the
plea periods varied, the patent applications during the plea period were rescaled to ten-year
periods. 55 The results of these patent tallies—“pre-plea,” “plea,” and “post-plea”—are

50

An EC decision might not always reveal the true start date of a cartel. When firms admit to guilt
as part of negotiations with the EC, they have an incentive to bargain to shorten the reported cartel duration
so as to reduce fines and damages from follow-on civil litigation. Thus, the start date reported in an EC
decision may be the result of a negotiation between the Commission and the cartelists.
51

This figure is reproduced from Serial Collusion, supra note 14, at 308 fig.5.

52

In 2017, one of us (Marshall) acknowledged the difficulties of analyzing unobserved, explicit

collusion:
Before moving forward, allow me to note that we do not know the extent and scope of
unobserved explicit collusion. At one extreme, all previously existing explicit collusion
may have been detected and no continuing or new explicit collusion may exist. At another
extreme, detected explicit collusion may be just the tip of the iceberg. Namely, there may
be vast amounts [of collusion] continuing and newly forming throughout the world. Unlike
some other illegal activities, measuring the scope and magnitude of unobserved explicit
collusion suffers from truncation, which creates classically difficult inference problems.
Unobserved Collusion, supra note 14, at 330.
53

We counted patent applications as opposed to granted patents because there is a significant delay
between patent applications and grants. The count of applications that matured into grants helps us identify
the immediate response of firms to the formation of a cartel.
54

Appendix B provides a detailed description of how we assembled these numbers. This appendix
should enable the reader to fully reproduce everything we report here.
55

For example, if a plea period was 5 years, then the patent applications for each firm were
multiplied by two. If the plea period ran for 30 years, the patent applications for the plea period were
multiplied by one-third.
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reflected in three columns in Figure 3. Further explanation of how these patents were tallied
and organized appears in Appendix B.

Figure 1: European Chemical Firm Cartel Involvement by Product Market,
from EC Decisions 1980 to Present
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Figure 2: European Chemical Firm Cartel Involvement by Firm, from EC
Decisions 1980 to Present
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Figure 3: Empirical Findings Regarding Patenting by Large Multi-Product
Chemical Firms that Regularly Participate in Cartels
Firm
Akzo
BASF
Bayer
Solvay
Degussa
Shell
ICI
Arkema (AAA)
Hoechst
RP
Aventis
Total
% Change, Preplea to Plea
% Change, Plea
to Post-plea

Producers of Cartel Chemical
Pre-plea
Plea
Post-plea
105
158
128
246
523
824
490
610
541
157
223
303
189
280
461
154
262
416
283
257
214
291
326
586
168
458
891
23
89
38
4
62
36
2110
3248
4438
54%

Non-producers of Cartel Chemical
Pre-plea
Plea
Post-plea
207
414
389
1037
1639
1527
523
753
653
107
175
267
109
190
331
289
185
153
119
74
41
119
115
149
557
439
131
277
276
253
55
148
246
3399
4408
4140
30%

37%

-6%

Figure 4: Patenting Practices of “Core” Serial Colluders, as Compared to
“Non-core” Serial Colluders
Firm
“Core” Serial
Producers
% Change, Preplea to Plea
% Change, Plea
to Post-plea
“Non-core”
Serial
Colluders
% change preplea to plea
% change plea
to post-plea

Producers of Cartel Chemical
Pre-plea
Plea
Post plea
1187
1794
2257

Non-producers of Cartel Chemical
Pre-plea
Plea
Post-plea
1983
3171
3167

51%

60%
26%

923

1454

2181

58%

0%
1416

1237

973

-13%
50%
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-21%

As noted above, Figure 3 displays the tallies of the number of patents that firms applied
for in three time periods: “pre-plea,” “plea,” and “post-plea.” Patents were organized by
filing date and only tallied if a patent was ultimately granted. For each firm, patents
awarded in these periods were sorted into two groups: on the left side, chemical patents
awarded to cartel members, aggregated across enforcement actions (“Producers of Cartel
Chemical”); on the right side, patents associated with a firm who was not party to the cartel
or a producer of the cartel product, as adjudged by review of the same enforcement actions
(“Non-producers of Cartel Chemical”). We relied on EC reports to determine if a firm was
a seller of a chemical and was not prosecuted as a member of the cartel for that chemical. 56
The bottom of Figure 3 displays totals of patents awarded across the three relevant time
periods for each firm. We also calculated the percentage changes in patenting for each firm
and overall across the pre-plea to plea time frames and plea to post-plea time frames. The
trends that this data reveal is analyzed in greater detail below.
Figure 4 reorganizes the same data from Figure 3, sorting firms into two buckets: “core”
serial colluders and “non-core” serial colluders. 57 “Core” serial colluders include Akzo,
BASF, Bayer, Solvay, and Degussa (ABBSD). The remaining six firms (Shell, ICI,
Arkema, Hoechst, RP, and Aventis) were marked as “non-core” serial colluders.
From review of the data in Figure 3, we find that there was a surge in patenting by
cartel members on chemicals covered by the cartel during the plea period. In the pleaperiod, the adjusted total number of patent applications by the chemical firms which the
EC deemed to have participated in a cartel for a given product was over 3,200 patents, as
compared to close to 2,100 patents in the pre-plea period. The total number of patent
applications was 54% higher for serial colluders in the plea period than in the pre-plea
period, reflecting a surge in patenting activity. This trend continued in the post-plea period,

56
More precisely, we have no information that these firms are producers. The EC prohibition
decisions do not name them—an omission that may only mean that the firm had no sales for the product in
the European Union. A “non-producer” could make the product entirely for internal consumption. In addition,
a “non-producer” could be making the product and not selling any of its output in the Europe Union. We
address some of these classification distinctions in Section III.C.
57

We call Akzo, BASF, Bayer, Solvay, and Degussa the “core” serial colluders because they are
the only serial colluders who engaged in the anomalous behavior of increased patenting of products that they
did not produce but which were cartelized by others. Also, these are the most frequent colluders, active in at
least seven cartels, except for Degussa, which was active in six. Finally, BASF and Bayer are the two main
descendants of the I.G. Farben conglomerate of Germany.
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where the number of patent applications by serial colluders rose to close to 4,400 patents,
37% higher in the post-plea period than in the plea period. Appendix B provides firmspecific details corroborating these results.
Is a 54% increase in patenting activity between the pre-plea and plea periods large
enough to raise suspicions about suspect motivations for patenting? Finding a good
benchmark for patenting activity is quite difficult. Trying to benchmark cartel participant
patenting activity against others in the industry is not a perfect solution, as other chemical
firms are potentially involved in collusion across other product types or their behavior may
be influenced by the cartel firms, even if they are not formal members of the cartel. For
example, patenting activity by Japanese chemical firms does not appear to be very different
than that of the European producers listed in Figure 1, but that could simply reflect the use
of patents by Japanese and European firms to define exclusive territories as part of
coordinated conduct. 58 Nevertheless, the fact that patenting for serial colluders increased
more across the pre-plea to the plea periods as compared to the plea to post-plea periods
may be a good indicator of suspect motivations for patenting. If innovation was
accelerating at an increasing rate, then we would expect for the results to be the opposite.
Further, it is important to remember that the plea periods for these cartels all differ in time;
thus, a surge in innovation over some specific time period is very unlikely to explain the
results. Rather, it seems that serial colluders deliberately increased patenting during plea
periods at a rate untethered to innovation improvements, for reasons further discussed
below.
Another interesting trend emerges from review of producer versus non-producer
patenting during the relevant pre-plea, plea and post-plea periods. If there was no
coordinated activity among non-cartel and cartel members, one would not expect any spike
in patenting for non-producers in the relevant periods above and beyond innovation
improvements. And yet, the data suggest that non-producer firms to some degree may
strategically be seeking patents during the relevant time periods as well. The “core” serial

58

Another potential benchmark might be university patent applications. That possibility is
diminished by the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (1980), which created great incentives for
universities and others receiving federal grants to seek patent applications. Enactment of Bayh-Dole means
that the rapid increase for these institutions is almost surely just a result of the change in the regulatory
environment.
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colluders, Akzo, BASF, Bayer, Degussa, and Solvay (ABBDS), generated over 4,400
patents related to chemical products that they themselves did not make but that their other
regular co-conspirators did make and cartelized markets for. Notably, core serial colluder
patent applications for cartelized products that they did not make increased by 60% from
the pre-plea to the plea period; a spike in patenting similar to that for producing firms
actually party to the cartel at issue. By contrast, as shown in Figure 4, patent applications
for non-core serial colluders in cartelized products that they did not make fell by 13% from
the pre-plea to plea periods and fell by 21% from the plea to post-plea periods. This
suggests the ABBDS firms garnered patents that could be used in a reciprocal fashion to
support cartels operated by their compatriots.
Of course, we cannot entirely reject the possibility that these patterns of patenting are
due to non-collusive motivations. As noted above, alternative explanations are industrywide or firm-specific innovation improvements. Some jumps or falls in patenting could
also be random occurrences. Yet, several facts cast doubt upon such explanations. First,
the firms at issue regularly participate in cartels with one another across a broad array of
chemical products. 59 Second, as described in greater detail below, patents are very useful
tools to facilitate cartel conduct. 60 Third, the fact that the increase in patent applications by
cartel members from the pre-plea to the plea period is greater than the increase from the
plea to the post-plea period strongly suggests an incremental value of patents for these
firms above and beyond protecting intellectual property. Fourth, a surge in patent
applications by the core serial colluder firms on products that they do not make but for
which their frequent co-conspirators are engaged in a cartel strongly suggests that at least
this subset of core serial colluders use patents to facilitate cartel conduct across products.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the plea periods for the 32 cartels that we analyze have
different start and end dates. Thus, the data we report across Figures 3 and 4 are unlikely
to be driven by some industry-wide innovation surge over a specific time period. Also, the
finding of a patent surge for non-producers from the pre-plea to the plea period pertains to
only the five most active cartel firms and not the other six. This implies that surges in
patenting are not being driven by some industry-wide phenomenon.
59

See Section III.B

60

See Section II.A.
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Having identified certain suspect patenting practices by serial colluders in the chemical
industry, we next explain that this behavior is rationally related to instituting and
maintaining a cartel. Before doing so, we lay some groundwork for how antitrust law
approaches collusive schemes involving patents and patent licensing. Then, we describe
competitive pressures that might drive firms to seek out patents as a means to institute and
maintain a cartel.
II.

PATENTS, COMPETITION, AND COLLUSION: THE EVOLUTION OF
ANTITRUST DOCTRINE AND POLICY
Most antitrust scholars agree that the patent system has procompetitive effects when it

works as intended. 61 Patents give inventors incentives to create new technology by
strengthening their ability to earn profits that cover the cost of inventing. 62 Patents achieve
this end by giving their owners the right to exclude others from making, using, and selling
the patented technology during the patent term. In return, patent owners must disclose their
invention to the public; thus, sharing the knowledge that they created. 63 This knowledge
will enter the public domain at the end of the patent period.
The right to exclude—the patent’s vital legal trait—is not an unmixed social blessing.
This right may slow the diffusion of new technology and sometimes leads to market power
in a patented product. These social costs must be balanced against the social gains arising
from patents’ innovation incentives and knowledge disclosure function. Moreover, patents
do not completely bar other firms from using the patented technology. Importantly, these
firms are free to utilize the invention if they obtain a license from the patent owner. When
patent owners and other inventors or manufacturers can come to an agreement to license

61

FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND
PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 1 (Oct. 2003) [hereinafter TO PROMOTE INNOVATION].
62

FREDERIC M. SCHERER & DAVID R. ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 621–30 (3d ed. 1990); Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and
Economics of Intellectual Property, 5 J. ECON. PERSPS. 3 (1991).
63

This bargain—exclusivity in return for disclosure—is a basic foundation for the U.S. process
through which patent rights are granted. CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION
WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 62–67 (2012); ROBERT P.
MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 247–302 (7th ed. 2017).
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the patented technology during the patent term, society gains doubly from the speedy
diffusion of new technology and royalty payments that reward inventors.
As a general matter, patent owners enjoy considerable discretion to draft patent
licensing agreements that they desire. Antitrust law usually allows said license agreements
to restrict licensees’ output, fields of use, or freedom to market covered products. 64
Antitrust law also tolerates license royalty provisions that raise the marginal cost of
licensees. 65 Relative to the absence of licensing, these restraints on competition during the
patent’s term are tolerated on the ground that such restrictions tend to promote technology
diffusion and more competitive markets after patent expiration. 66
In some instances, antitrust law also permits agreements among actual or potential
rivals to determine collectively how a group of firms will exploit their patent rights. The
creation of the Manufacturers’ Aircraft Association in the early twentieth century provides
an example of a socially beneficial use of cross-licensing agreements and a patent pool to
coordinate patent licensing covering complementary patented technologies. At the advent
of airplane technology, Orville and Wilbur Wright, i.e., the Wright brothers, and,
separately, Glenn Curtiss, had patent rights covering fundamental airplane technology. 67
No one, including the Wright Brothers and Curtiss, could avoid patent infringement when
making a commercial airplane unless they had permission from the three patent owners. 68
For years, Curtiss and the Wrights were locked in patent litigation that held up knowledge
transfer and caused the American airplane industry to lag behind developments in Europe.
Eventually, the patent owners resolved their dispute in response to pressure from Franklin
D. Roosevelt, then the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, to expedite preparation for the
64
Weimin Wu, Managing Cartels Through Patent Pools, 64 ANTITRUST BULL. 457, 457–73 (2019).
See also, Priest, supra note 6, at 314 (“Under the guise of patent license, a cartel can gain supracompetitive
profits without employing any detectable restriction on price. A cartel can agree on some other aspect of the
sale of the product to achieve the same result.”).
65

ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 22, at 1094–118.

66

HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST, supra note 6, at 525–28.

67

DAVID MCCULLOUGH, THE WRIGHT BROTHERS 249–53 (2015) (describing patent litigation
between the Wright brothers and Glenn Curtiss, all early aviation pioneers); LAWRENCE GOLDSTONE,
BIRDMEN: THE WRIGHT BROTHERS, GLENN CURTISS, AND THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE SKIES (2014)
(same).
68

Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective
Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1341 (1996) (“[W]here different firms hold patents on the basic
building blocks of the industry’s products, they will have to cross-license to produce at all.”).
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United States’s entry into World War I. 69 As a result, Curtiss and the Wright brothers’
fundamental patents (and many improvement patents) were contributed to a patent pool
called the Manufacturer’s Aircraft Association. The pool became a vehicle for airplane
patent owners to coordinate their patent licensing, but in this case, cooperation improved
social welfare as compared to no licensing at all. 70
However, patent license terms that maximize value to the licensor and licensee may
also cause unacceptable harm to third parties. 71 For example, antitrust may block a patent
license agreement that diminishes competition in markets for technology outside the scope
of the patent. 72 Antitrust may also block license agreements aimed at thwarting entry to
challenge patents that are likely invalid, or the use of such patents to divide a market among
competitors. 73 Both of these results are discussed in greater detail in Section II.A below.
The tricky question raised in the following section is how courts should distinguish
legitimate restrictions on competition that appropriately award inventors for their efforts
from illegitimate restrictions that harm competition without significantly promoting
invention. To address this inquiry, we sketch the evolution of antitrust enforcement policy
as it has applied to patent-related practices that could support collusive arrangements. In
doing so, we present some of the principal scenarios of alleged collusion that have appeared
in antitrust decisions involving patents, especially in cases that present complex patent
enforcement and licensing practices. We later propose some ways for settling this linedrawing question in Section IV.
A. Patents and Collusion in Antitrust Policy
From the earliest decades of antitrust law, antitrust policy in some eras has viewed the
patent system warily and has given careful attention to the possibility that patent licensing
69

Id. at 1356–57 (“In several cases where the government was concerned that technology useful to
the military was not being developed because of a logjam of conflicting property rights, the lurking threat of
the eminent domain power contributed to the formation of patent pools.”).
70

G. R. Simonson, The Demand for Aircraft and the Aircraft Industry, 1907-1958, 20 J. ECON. HIST.
361, 363–64 n.9 (1960).
71

TO PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 61.

72

DEP’T JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 8–9 (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/atr/IPguidelines/download
[hereinafter DOJ/FTC IP GUIDELINES].
73

Id.
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and pools could facilitate collusion and the monopolization of entire industries. 74 Perhaps
more than at any time in American history, these concerns crystalized during the
proceedings in the late 1930s and early 1940s of the Temporary National Economic
Committee (TNEC) and its “Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power.” 75 The
final TNEC report described the patent system and its operation in scathing terms:
No one can read the testimony developed before this committee on
patents without coming to a realization that in many important segments of
our economy the privilege accorded by the patent monopoly has been
shamefully abused. . . . It [patenting] has been used as a device to control
whole industries to suppress competition, to restrict output to enhance
prices, to suppress innovation, and to discourage inventiveness. 76
The TNEC report reflected the work of researchers who had documented how patent
licensing arrangements had facilitated the cartelization of global markets. 77 The acute
suspicion with which U.S. antitrust policy sometimes has treated patent licensing
arrangements almost surely flows out of findings in law enforcement initiatives and
academic studies from this era that patent licensing helped to cartelize sectors critical to

74

Walton Hamilton’s monograph on “Patents and Free Enterprise” for the Temporary National
Economic Committee in 1941 recounts the longstanding concern among antitrust specialists that patent
rights, unless properly constrained, would undermine competition. TEMP. NAT’L ECON. COMM., 76TH CONG.,
INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER: PATENTS AND FREE ENTERPRISE (Comm. Print
1940) (Walter Hamilton) [hereinafter Hamilton, PATENTS AND FREE ENTERPRISE]. In a section titled “The
Peril to Free Enterprise,” Hamilton observed that, “[i]n their concern with trade practices, the Federal Trade
Commission and the Department of Justice have been plagued with a legalistic conception of a patent as a
sacrosanct area in the economic realm.” Id. at 159. Hamilton cautioned that a rebalancing of the interests of
the patent system and the antitrust regime was necessary: “If presently the patent is not brought into accord,
free enterprise can survive only on the fringes of a closed economy.” Id. at 163.
75

TEMP. NAT’L ECON. COMM., 77th CONG., INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC
POWER: FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TEMPORARY NATIONAL ECONOMIC COMMITTEE
(Comm. Print 1941) [hereinafter TNEC FINAL REPORT]. On April 29, 1938, President Franklin D. Roosevelt
asked Congress to conduct a study of economic concentration in the United States. Id. at 11–20. In June of
1938, the President approved a joint resolution of Congress establishing a Temporary National Economic
Committee to conduct the inquiry. Id. at 691–93. The significance of the TNEC proceedings is examined in
Albert A. Foer, Putting the Antitrust Modernization Commission into Perspective, 51 Buff. L. Rev. 1029,
1032–36 (2003).
76

TNEC FINAL REPORT, supra note 75, at 36.

77

See Hamilton, PATENTS AND FREE ENTERPRISE, supra note 74, at 165 (“In peace or at war the
international cartel poses its problem. A corporation barricades its monopoly by securing grants in all the
dominant nations. If concerns here and abroad lay claim to rival technologies, the conflict is usually resolved
by a private understanding. . . . The consumer is denied the protection of competition; and an agreement
between gentlemen which vaults over frontiers becomes the actual regulation of commerce with foreign
nations.”).
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the World War II mobilization effort. 78 The TNEC proceedings also lent support to existing
efforts by Thurman Arnold, then the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, to challenge
domestic and international cartels that used patent licenses as coordination mechanisms. 79
Much of what we know about the early use of patent licensing as a collusive device comes
from government cases initiated in the 1930s and from the TNEC proceedings.
In addition to agency reports and congressional hearings, government litigation in the
mid-twentieth century reflected a larger effort to bring antitrust law to bear on collusive,
patent-based schemes. During this time period, the DOJ prosecuted a variety of antitrust
cases in which patent practices provided crucial means for executing improper collusive
schemes. 80 We highlight three factual scenarios involving allegations of illegal concerted
action involving patents in litigated cases: patent pools, cross-licenses, and price
restrictions.

81

The illustrative cases below do not expressly address the special

anticompetitive possibilities presented by patenting activity and patent practices in the

78

FORMATION OF THE POSTWAR PERIOD, supra note 29, at 96–107.

79
Id. at 83–89. By the late 1930s, the DOJ had given high priority to investigating the use of patents
as collusive and exclusionary mechanisms. ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF
MONOPOLY 368–70 (1966) (describing DOJ efforts to scrutinize “the use of patent laws to create and
perpetuate monopolistic strongholds.”). Arnold testified on behalf of the DOJ Antitrust Division before the
TNEC body at the close of its proceedings. TNEC FINAL REPORT, supra note 75, at 98–138. At several points,
he emphasized how the DOJ was working to prosecute cartels in sectors that supplied vital means for the
wartime mobilization. Id. at 99 (testimony of Thurman Arnold stating that “expenditures for national defense
have imposed the immediate task on the Antitrust Division of breaking up combinations which are restricting
production in national-defense industries or which are causing the Government to pay artificial prices for its
defense materials.”).
80
For notable examples of government antitrust cases in this period that attacked patent practices as
illegal agreements under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1980), or as conspiracies to
monopolize under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1980), see infra notes 85–91, 100–04, 124–
25 and accompanying text.
81

A separate body of cases, not treated in this paper, has focused on patenting behavior as a form
of illegal, single-firm misconduct. The leading patent-antitrust cases of this category are analyzed in F. M.
Scherer, Technological Innovation and Monopolization (John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Harvard Univ.,
Faculty Research Working Papers Series, No. RWP07-043, Oct. 2007) [hereinafter Technological Innovation
and Monopolization].
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context of serial collusion by multi-product firms, yet their fact patterns and analysis are
consistent with some of the serial collusion concerns we address in Sections III and IV.

Scenario 1: Patent Pools and Cross-Licensing
Some antitrust cases have challenged patent pools on the ground that the contested
pooling arrangements facilitated industry-wide coordination of output and pricing. One
notable illustration is Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States. 82 In the case, several
petroleum refiners held patents on a new catalytic cracking process that enabled refiners to
extract a larger amount of higher valued products (e.g., gasoline) from a barrel of crude
oil. 83 To avoid litigation over their competing claims, the firms pooled their patents, crosslicensed to each other, and agreed to share royalties received from licenses under the
patents in a fixed proportion. The DOJ claimed the arrangement enabled the refiners to
eliminate competition among the patentees over royalty rates. Applying a rule of reason
test, the Supreme Court upheld the participants’ cross-licensing and royalty division
practices. The Court wrote that the challenged practices often are necessary to prevent
infringement litigation from blocking technical progress and concluded that the royalty
division mechanism could not adversely affect prices because gasoline produced from the
use of the patented cracking technology constituted only 26 percent of all gasoline output. 84
Two features of the Standard Oil (Indiana) decision are interesting for our purposes.
First, the Court took an expansive view of the benefits of the settlements that supported the
patent pool and seemed less sensitive to, or unaware of, their anticompetitive possibilities,
including their tendency to suppress challenges to the validity of weak patents. For serial
colluders, the aura of legitimacy that surrounds patent settlements might increase the
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283 U.S. 163 (1931).

83

Catalytic cracking represented an important advance in refining technology. Before cracking
became commonplace, refineries relied mainly on distillation units that separated hydrocarbons by boiling
crude oil and using fractionation towers to separate components of different densities and boiling points. The
Petroleum Industry: Hearings on S. 2387 and related bills Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., Part 3, at 2143–44 (1975) (testimony of Frederic M. Scherer
regarding vertical integration in the petroleum industry).
84

By treating distillation and cracking as fungible, the Court underestimated the significance of
cracking. Because it gave refiners important cost advantages, cracking likely constituted a distinct relevant
market. Seen that way, the share of output covered by the challenged patent arrangements would have been
over 50 percent (instead of a 26 percent share of all gasoline output).
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attractiveness of such agreements as a means to create or reinforce the structures vital to
cartel success. Second, the Standard (Indiana) decision notes that pooling and settlements
may be inevitable and essential to achieving economic progress where many firms engage
in patenting related to a specific technology. This raises the question, which we discuss
below, of whether cartel members might strategically strive to obtain as many patents as
possible as one way to create a nexus of conflicting rights that only can be resolved by
agreement among rivals who own these rights. In other words, intensive patenting can
create the condition that necessitates pooling and related settlements, and these
arrangements can provide useful cartel administration infrastructure.
Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States provides a second, important illustration of the
competitive concerns that can arise in pooling and cross-licensing arrangements. 85 This
case dealt with the use of patents to implement price fixing by glass manufacturers. In the
first half of the twentieth century, glass manufacturing was a competitive and
technologically progressive industry. Process innovation during this period allowed for
automation of most manufacturing activities. However, the industry moved toward
collusion when two key players, Hartford and a Corning subsidiary named Empire, settled
patent litigation and reached a cross-license agreement in 1916. Subsequently, Hartford
and Owens (another glass manufacturer) settled patent litigation in 1924, then jointly
bought up most remaining glassmaking patents from other manufacturers. With Corning,
Hartford and Owens at the core of the patent cross-licensing agreements, most
manufacturers were organized into a cartel that relied on product market division. Corning
enjoyed an exclusive license to make certain kinds of blown glass, Owens-Illinois had the
exclusive right to make pressed glass using the suction process, and Thatcher held the
exclusive right to make milk bottles. 86 The licenses for fruit jars went to Ball and OwensIllinois, and eventually to Hazel-Atlas. Hazel-Atlas resisted the manufacturers’ cartel for
several years but joined in 1932 to settle patent litigation.
Making its case, the DOJ accused the several glass manufacturer defendants of
conspiring to fix prices and monopolize the market for glass making. At the time of the
suit, 96% of U.S. glass output was made using glass machinery licenses: Hartford owned
85

323 U.S. 386 (1945).

86

Id. at 396–400
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more than 600 patents, Corning owned more than 100, Hazel owned more than 70, Owens
owned more than 60, and Lynch owned 12. 87 All of these patents were merged into a pool
that effectively permitted defendants to control industry output and pricing. 88 On certiorari,
the Supreme Court upheld the district court’s ruling that the patent licensing agreements
violated the Sherman Act. 89 The remedy required the defendants to offer a reasonable
royalty on their patents going forward and blocked future use of patent license terms that
could facilitate collusion. 90
Analyzing the result in Hartford-Empire, it is easy to see the risk of collusion created
by aggressive patent acquisition and enforcement coupled with licensing terms that allocate
product markets. This result also differs from that of the aircraft manufacturing patent pool,
described in the Curtiss and the Wright brothers example above. Whereas the glass patent
pool and airplane patents both tied up a significant portion of the relevant industry, the
airplane patents covered fundamental technologies and represented blocking patents as to
each other. By contrast, the glass patent pool covered relatively pedestrian inventions.
Thus, the Court’s finding of anticompetitive effect and imposition of required licensing at
reasonable rates is a sensible result in Hartford-Empire. Our assessment of HartfordEmpire would be different if we were convinced that key patents in the pool were
technologically significant and mutually blocking. 91
The Hartford-Empire case facts also suggest ways in which the benefits of patent
licenses to cartels are magnified when the colluding firms pool their patents and establish

87

Id.
Id. at 398.
89
Id. at 401–02.
90
Id. at 413–14.
91
Our sentiment here parallels recent policy in the DOJ and FTC that looks favorably at pools
containing only “standard essential patents.” By definition, such patents cover significant and complementary
technology related to computers and communications. The DOJ issued business review letters “that endorse
a policy of ex ante price disclosure at VITA (an SSO that promotes the VMEbus computer architecture) and
the IEEE. The VITA policy requires IP holders to commit to a ‘price cap’ (i.e. a maximum royalty rate and
most restrictive set of licensing terms), which can be amended downwards, while the IEEE policy allows
firms to disclose their most restrictive licensing terms on a voluntary basis.” Timothy Simcoe, Can Standard
Setting Organizations Address Patent Holdup? Comments for The Federal Trade Commission 13 (2011)
(internal citation omitted), http://people.bu.edu/tsimcoe/documents/working/Simcoe-FTC-SSO-Commentsv2.pdf (prepared comment for 2011 FTC conference on the topic of tools to prevent “hold-up” issues created
by patents. See also Tools to Prevent Patent “Hold-up”: IP Rights in Standard Setting, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2011/06/tools-prevent-patent-hold-ip-rights-standardsetting (last accessed May 15, 2021) (with links to download all submitted comments at the 2011 FTC
conference, including that of Timothy Simcoe).
88
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an independent entity to administer the pool. A vertical licensor-licensee relationship
between an upstream and downstream firm is less likely to be subjected to antitrust
scrutiny 92 because vertical agreements are subject to a more permissive standard of review
that considers procompetitive justifications from firm coordination. 93 By contrast,
agreements among horizontal competitors to fix prices, set output levels, divide territories,
or allocate customers are generally treated as per se illegal, as they are thought to have a
greater potential to cause social harm. 94 Yet, the disparate treatment of vertical and
horizontal agreements can be questionable when the upstream pool manager is working for
the downstream licensees who hope to achieve a cartel in their market. In these cases, the
upstream actor may merely be coordinating horizontal dealing in a “hub-and-spoke”
arrangement without providing procompetitive benefits to the market. 95 Nevertheless, it is
hard for courts and enforcers to distinguish desirable pool managers who offer one-stop
licensing of a vast portfolio of patents from those who simply work to promote a licensees’
cartel. 96

92

Herbert Hovenkamp & Christopher R. Leslie, The Firm as Cartel Manager, 64 VAND. L. REV.
813, 842 (2011) [hereinafter Cartel Manager] (noting that vertical communication is less likely to attract the
attention of anti-cartel enforcers).
93

Douglas H. Ginsburg et al., Antitrust and Intellectual Property in the United States and the
European Union, in THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN COMPETITION LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY—AN
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 99, 103 (Gariella Muscolo & Marina Tavassi eds., 2019); see also Leegin
Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 907 (2007) (“Vertical price restraints are to be
judged according to the rule of reason.”).
94
Ginsburg et al., supra note 93, at 105–06; see also United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S.
364, 388–89 (1948) (condemning arrangement by which rivals pooled patents to produce gypsum and agreed
to take a license setting royalties by a common formula and fixing the downstream price of gypsum products);
United States v. Nat’l Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 325–28 (1947) (banning patent cross-licensing scheme that
divided global markets).
95

Federal antitrust agencies have challenged a number of these hub-and-spoke arrangements in
settings that did not involve patents. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939); United
States v. Apple Inc., 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015); Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000).
96

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Competition Committee
has identified this concern when describing FTC enforcement experience in the 1990s:
The main concern regarding cross-licensing and pooling arrangements is that they can be
used to cover up a collusive agreement by mechanisms such as the joint marketing of
pooled intellectual property rights with collective price setting or coordinated output
restrictions that do not contribute to an efficiency-enhancing integration of economic
activity among the participants. Such anticompetitive effects are more likely to occur when
the IP rights being cross-licensed or pooled comprise substitute technologies, i.e. the IP
rights’ holders are potential competitors in a horizontal relationship. . . . A
contemporaneous example can be observed in the [United States], where the FTC
challenged a pool of patents relating to the manufacture and use of lasers employed in
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There are several other ways that patent pools can facilitate cartels. These are not
directly addressed in the Hartford-Empire decision, but they emerge as implications that
cartel members—especially serial colluders—might derive from the glass cartel
experience. One benefit is that combining the patent portfolios of the members creates a
bigger stick to punish deviators and deter entry. 97 A second advantage is that buyer
resistance to higher cartel prices may be reduced if sellers in the cartel can deceive buyers
and attribute price increases to the royalties imposed by the pool, which supposedly are out
of sellers’ control.

Scenario 2: Price Restrictions
A second distinct category of antitrust case law has wrestled with the question of
whether a patentee may control the price at which its licensees can sell a product making
use of the patented technology. In the early years of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court
in E. Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Co. took the position that a patentee may enforce
minimum price clauses in its licenses. 98 The Court reasoned that because it had no
obligation to license its patent, the patentee had the right to condition the grant of a license
upon the licensee’s agreement to sell the patented good at or above a designated price.
Thus, the Court permitted an explicit price restraint so long as it was incorporated into a
patent licensing agreement.

performing eye surgeries in 1998. The two companies comprising the pool were the only
firms whose laser equipment had obtained the marketing approval from the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration for performing the surgery. Through the pool, Summit and VISX
relinquished the right to license their patents unilaterally, but each received the right to
prohibit the pool from licensing [to] any third party. The pool issued no third-party licences
[sic] over its six-year existence. In addition, the pool agreement required the payment of a
minimum fee for each procedure performed with its laser equipment, i.e. the pool set a
price floor for the “per-procedure fee” that each company charged ophthalmologists using
its equipment. The FTC alleged that the pool eliminated competition between the pool
members in the sale or leasing of the laser equipment and in the licensing of related
technology. The FTC’s allegations concerning the pool were settled through consent orders
that dissolved the agreement.
OECD, DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS COMPETITION COMMITTEE, Licensing of IP
Rights
and
Competition
Law
25–26
(June
6,
2019),
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2019)3/en/pdf [hereinafter Licensing of IP Rights].
97

About 15% of chemical patents are traded. Carlos J. Serrano, The Dynamics of the Transfer and
Renewal of Patents, 41 RAND J. ECON. 686, 693 (2010).
98

186 U.S. 70 (1902).
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In United States v. General Electric Co., the Supreme Court rejected a DOJ
challenge to a patent licensing agreement between General Electric (GE) and
Westinghouse that enabled Westinghouse to produce and sell incandescent lamps covered
by GE’s patents. 99 The DOJ attacked a licensing provision that required Westinghouse to
set prices for its lamps at the same levels that GE set for its own distributors. The Court
reasoned that the restriction was a reasonable method for GE to achieve an appropriate
return on its investment in developing its lamp technology. The Court did not consider
other less benign motivations, such as the use of the licensing provision to support
coordination between the two firms. And, if GE’s patents were infirm, the license could
help ensure that the company’s chief rival (Westinghouse) would not contest their validity.
The pricing term thus could assist the two companies in coordinating the output and pricing
of electric lamps.
On many subsequent occasions, the DOJ has brought cases to challenge the rule of
General Electric. 100 The agency has succeeded in limiting the rule; however, it has not
convinced the Supreme Court to repudiate it. In United States v. Masonite Corp., 101 the
DOJ persuaded the Supreme Court to strike down licenses where the patentee had set the
price at which its licensees sold products making use of its patent. The Court treated the
arrangement as a traditional horizontal price-fixing conspiracy and emphasized that, unlike
the circumstances of General Electric, Masonite did all of the manufacturing for its
licensees, which distributed the patented product at the price set by Masonite. Later in the
same decade as Masonite, the DOJ again invited the Supreme Court to overrule General
Electric. In United States v. Line Material, 102 the DOJ challenged a cross-licensing
agreement where the holders of a “basic patent” and an “improvement patent” licensed
their technologies to each other and imposed a price limitation of the type that the Court
had approved in General Electric. The defendants argued that the cross-licensing
arrangement was necessary to overcome a commonplace patent blocking problem. In

99

272 U.S. 476 (1926).

100

These efforts are recounted in HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST, supra note 6, at 541–54;
UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAWS 233–36 (Mar. 31, 1955).
101

316 U.S. 265 (1942).

102

333 U.S. 287 (1948).
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upholding the DOJ’s complaint, the Court distinguished General Electric on the ground
that the two patentees had engaged in a “combination” and that such combinations violated
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 103 The erosion of General Electric continued in United
States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 104 where the Supreme Court barred a price restraint contained
in the license of pooled patents assigned to a holding company. Unlike in Line Material,
the patents in questions were substitutes and not complements. The Court distinguished
General Electric on the ground that the licensing mechanism was a holding company that
acted on behalf of the contributors to the patent pool.
In sum, patent holders remain able to set prices for their licensees’ products making
use of the patent, but they are mostly limited to the facts of General Electric if they try to
do so. This provides uncertain protection to firms seeking to invoke the shelter of General
Electric. 105 That said, patent holders remain able to set royalty rates in their licensing
agreements that functionally allow them to retain a good deal of control over market output
and pricing.
B. Patent Practices as Sources of Cartel Stability Though Not Always a Total
Solution for Cartel Coordination
The government’s investigation of patent practices and the records of prosecuted
cases illuminate the capacity of licensing terms to enhance cartel stability. In many
historical cases, patents played a simple role in price-fixing agreements: licenses set caps
on or restricted output by means of territorial, customer, or field-of-use restrictions. In
some cases, the licenses specified prices or restricted price-setting. 106 In these examples,

103
This distinction has mystified generations of commentators. See, e.g., WARD S. BOWMAN, JR.,
PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL 195 (1973) (critiquing the Court’s
efforts in Line Material to distinguish General Electric, stating “A more arbitrary and unprincipled per se
rule would be difficult to construct.”).
104

342 U.S. 371 (1952).

105
See HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST, supra note 6, at 543 (“Analytically deficient, as it
is, it is not surprising that the status of General Electric is clouded by the criticism which it has evoked and
the stinginess with which it has been construed. Though in some sense the case remains law, one cannot rely
on it in counseling . . . . The alacrity with which courts have distinguished General Electric and the fact that
since 1926 no majority of the Supreme Court has been ready to affirm it serve warning that even narrowly
read, the case provides no basis for planning a licensing program.”).
106

See also Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 604–05
(2004) (describing the use of patent licenses to stabilize price-fixing agreements).
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patents were helpful tools to enable firms to form and maintain a cartel, although they were
often also violative of antitrust law.
Unexplained, however, is why prosecuted cartels would put in place pricing,
allocation, and enforcement structures with co-conspirators if they can suppress rivalry
through legally enforceable patent licenses alone. Presumably, it could be the case that
many unobserved cartels are run only or mainly with patent licenses. Thus, enforcement
cases might be skewed toward fact sets where firms adopt more explicit coordinating
conduct. But this still begs the question as to why we see so many prosecuted colluders
implement cartel structures with measures that extend well beyond patent licenses. We
offer three possible explanations below.
First, agreements that are designed to encumber interfirm rivalry will be inherently
incomplete. Specifically, many unanticipated circumstances will arise that will cause
colluding firms to enter into discussions to reaffirm cartel structures and ensure compliance
with the agreement. Incomplete contracts are not unique to cartel agreements, 107 but said
agreements are not legally enforceable. Thus, the incompleteness issues that arise are likely
to be more extensive than for a legally enforceable contract. Because patent licenses are
legally enforceable, they would seem to be a partial solution to this problem. This may
explain, at least in part, their prevalence in cartel agreements. Yet, like any other contract,
the incompleteness of even patent license agreements requires discussion by cartel
members regarding unforeseen circumstances.
Second, patent licenses in mature product markets or industries are probably best used
for coarse components of the cartel structures. For example, European and Japanese
chemical firms may license to each other with the intent of creating a geographic division
across their two markets. But patent license agreements are unlikely to have enough
specificity to, say, delineate price increases twice a year by licensees as well as articulate
the rationale that will be offered to buyers regarding the justifications for these price
increases.
Third, diffusing buyer resistance is crucial to the success of a cartel. For example, as
cartel participants restrain output and drive up prices, buyers will attempt to lure cartel

107

Jean Tirole, Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?, 67 ECONOMETRICA 741 (1999).
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members into offering lower prices for a greater volume of business. This may lead to
cheating on the cartel agreement. In this and many other ways, buyers can resist price
increases, and it would be a difficult task to write a fully contingent license agreement that
anticipated all such attempts. In practice, many communications between cartel members
are about thwarting buyer resistance.
Overall, patents can facilitate cartel formation and stability. In some cases, however,
cartel meetings and structures may still be necessary. In other cases, it is possible that
experienced colluders, who make nearly the entirety of industry output for a product, can
accomplish the suppression of rivalry primarily through use of patent licenses where
ongoing discussions about license terms are nothing more than disguised cartel meetings.
C. Patents and the Evasion of Antitrust Scrutiny
As introduced above, past enforcement experience suggests a number of ways in which
patent practices can assist cartel members in avoiding detection and prosecution. In
general, patent licenses provide a cloak of apparent legitimacy to the interaction of
competitors that otherwise would raise regulators’ suspicions. Patent licensing also
presents an opportunity for cartel members to speak frankly about inputs and prices, create
cartel evasion penalties, and pass off coordinating conduct to internal actors as legitimate
business activity.
In a non-collusive setting, the owner of a patent on a valuable invention ordinarily can
refuse to license its new technology. 108 To avoid this holdup problem, the law gives the
patent owner a measure of protection from antitrust law to encourage licensing. 109 Certain
field-of-use, territorial, or customer exclusivity provisions that might raise regulatory flags
outside of the patent licensing context may be permitted. Yet, colluding firms can mimic

108

Ginsburg et al., supra note 93, at 107–08.

109

A policy paper prepared by the OECD Competition Committee Secretariat has identified the
competitively ambiguous nature of such licensing practices:
Field-of-use, territorial or customer exclusivity raise antitrust concerns mainly if there is a
horizontal relationship among licensors, among licensees, or between the licensor and its
licensee(s). At the same time, . . . it is widely accepted that such restraints may serve
procompetitive ends. It follows that a finding of whether such clauses infringe competition
law depends on the balancing of pro- and anticompetitive effects.
OECD, Licensing of IP, supra note 96, at 19.
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the practices of non-collusive patent licensors to achieve their anticompetitive goals.110
Even outside of the patent context, these types of restraints on trade may have been the
goal of collusive firms. Seeking licensing arrangements to achieve these ends, then,
provides protection from antitrust enforcement without societal benefit.
Further, the processes for negotiating and enforcing licensing agreements can afford
valuable advantages to cartel members. In order to reach an agreement on licensing terms,
parties may be willing to share information about input costs and pricing that would
otherwise be impermissible for rivals to share. 111 The meetings in which parties negotiate
licensing terms are facially legitimate and thus do not have to be kept secret, though the
terms agreed upon usually are kept secret. 112
Patent licensing schemes may also be part of a larger cartel maintenance strategy.
Licensors often impose audit provisions to ensure licensees cannot evade paying royalties
that are sometimes calculated as a percentage of sales or a fee based on output. 113 A
collusive patent licensor can use this audit mechanism to detect and discourage cheating

110

The same OECD policy paper observes:
Licensing arrangements can nonetheless pose competitive risks. Foremost among these is
the risk of cartelisation [sic], which can arise whenever the agreement is between actual or
potential competitors in a given market. Collusion can take place in the market for products
manufactured using the licensed technology or in the market for the licensed technology
itself. In the market for products manufactured using the licensed technology, cartel
agreements between licensees can be implemented by ostensibly vertical distribution
agreements, e.g. by inducing licensors to impose resale price maintenance and thus fixing
prices at the licensee level. Vertical price fixing may also contribute to the stability of a
cartel arrangement at the licensor level by making the licensors’ retail prices more
transparent and stable.

Id. at 15.
111
As Professor Priest noted in his groundbreaking paper on patent licensing as a means for
collusion, U.S. patent laws have been interpreted to give licensors “broad authority to set licensee output, to
allocate licensee territories, and even to fix minimum licensee prices.” Priest, supra note 6, at 309. These
interpretations give actual or potential rivals a legitimate reason to exchange sensitive information that could
raise serious antitrust concerns outside the setting of patent licensing.
112

Cartel Manager, supra note 92, at 842 (suggesting that the risk of cartel detection increases as
communication between competitors increases).
113

See RUSSELL L. PARR, ROYALTY RATES FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 187–96 (2007)
(describing mechanisms for auditing and monitoring of fulfillment of royalty terms in licensing agreements
for patents and other forms of intellectual property).
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on cartel rules. Licenses may also have termination or penalty provisions that could be
invoked by a licensor to punish a firm that deviated from cartel rules. 114
In addition to the benefit of having output restrictions that are legally enforceable,
patent licenses may serve a valuable internal function to avoid raising compliance concerns
with in-house counsel or a firm’s board of directors. Specifically, each cartel firm can
“explain” to counsel and its sales force that restrictions on where to sell, how much to sell,
and pricing are part of patent license agreements with rivals as opposed to revealing a
cartel. 115 Clever cartel managers have the opportunity to coordinate multiple licenses with
fellow colluders to induce desired output restrictions while hiding the operation of the
cartel in plain sight, even from fellow employees. Outside counsel can be used to draft the
licenses without raising ethical concerns, as they are less likely to know the industry well
enough to recognize the collusive purpose of these agreements. And the board of directors
will avoid knowledge of illegal activity that would typically require a board’s response.

114

See Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory of Self-Enforcing Collusion, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 295, 318 (1987). Professor Ayres analyzes the behavior of General Electric and Westinghouse in the
early twentieth century light bulb industry and describes:
[C]onsider the opportunities for including binding punishment threats in sham patent
licenses. Such opportunities are illustrated in the General Electric/Westinghouse light bulb
license. In 1912, General Electric granted to Westinghouse patent licenses for the
manufacture and sale of light bulbs. The license required Westinghouse to maintain the
price that General Electric charged for bulbs and to pay a royalty of two per cent [sic] of
net sales—which rose, however, to 10 per cent [sic] if Westinghouse’s net sales exceeded
15 percent of General Electric-Westinghouse total net sales.
George Priest has suggested that the license agreement might have been used to fix price: “A
royalty of 2 per cent indicates either that the patent was trivial and the parties were simply
price-fixers, or that General Electric was distributing patent rents in return for an agreement to
fix price and limit output.” The increasing royalty is especially relevant to the issue of
punishment. For if General Electric’s patent were invalid and the license agreement were
entered solely to facilitate collusion, then the escalating royalty would punish price-chiseling.
Westinghouse would be deterred from giving secret price cuts in order to increase its output
beyond the 15 percent market share that triggered the punishment royalty, which was five
times higher.
Id. at 318.
115

Aggressive sales representatives often cause fights within cartels, as through making excess
sales, they can cause a firm to cheat on cartel rules. Absent the patent license, evidence that a firm openly
punished an aggressive sales force could be used as evidence of price fixing.
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III.

ECONOMICS OF EXPLICIT COLLUSION WITH EXTENSION TO SERIAL
COLLUDERS’ PATENT ACTIVITY 116
In the previous section, we suggested that past antitrust enforcement experience yields

insights about how patent licensing practices can provide valuable means for effective
cartel management—for example, by providing instruments to formulate and adjust
collusive agreements, by increasing opportunities for communication in contexts that
generally do not attract suspicion, and making the punishment of cheaters and deterrence
of entrants more credible. In the following sections, we take care to distinguish how
encounters across multiple markets makes collusion easier and more effective as compared
to single market collusion. In particular, we lay out how patents play new roles or are more
effective in facilitating cartelization in the serial collusion context as compared to the single
market setting. First, we review the economics of explicit collusion, starting with the basics
and recalling our analysis from our earlier work regarding serial colluders, and then extend
that analysis to include the use of patents by serial colluders.
A. Basics of the Economics of Explicit Collusion
Under what circumstances does an industry have a proclivity for explicit collusion?117
A proclivity for collusion indicates that there are characteristics of the industry that result
in a potential substantial payoff from explicit collusion by participant firms. Michael
Porter’s Five Forces Model (PFF) provides a compelling way to understand this proclivity.
Figure 5: Adapted Graphic of Michael Porter’s Five Forces 118

116
The arguments and analyses in this section are largely drawn from George J. Stigler, A Theory
of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964) and ROBERT C. MARSHALL & LESLIE M. MARX, THE ECONOMICS
OF COLLUSION: CARTELS AND BIDDING RINGS (2012) [hereinafter ECONOMICS OF COLLUSION].
117

A definition of “industry” offered by Michael Porter in 1979 is a “group of competitors producing
substitutes that are close enough that the behavior of any firm affects each of the others either directly or
indirectly.” Michael E. Porter, The Structure within Industries and Companies’ Performance, 61 REV. ECON.
& STATISTICS 214, 215 (1979).
118

ECONOMICS OF COLLUSION, supra note 116, at 94 fig.5.1. Reprinted with permission of MIT

Press.
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PFF identifies the forces that impact the profitability of an industry. The center force is
interfirm rivalry. Going clockwise from the top, other forces include the threat of new
entry, bargaining power of buyers, possibility of substitute products, and bargaining power
of suppliers. The following conditions imply that the perimeter forces are conducive to
high profits for the industry: little threat of entry, limited bargaining power of buyers, few
close substitute goods, and limited bargaining power of suppliers. If these conditions are
met, then the primary detriment to the profits of the industry will be interfirm rivalry. This
implies that an agreement among producers to suppress interfirm rivalry can be quite
profitable, provided that the agreement anticipates the primary challenges of explicit
collusion: members cheating on the cartel scheme and external actors making adjustments
to cartelization of the market. 119
First, for explicit collusion to be effective, the agreement must mitigate secret
deviations by the cartel members. Each member will want to cheat on the agreement by
secretly selling to buyers at prices that somewhat undercut the cartel and at a greater
volume than they would otherwise sell. To avoid this difficulty, the cartel firms must adopt
structures addressing challenges on three fronts: pricing, allocation, and enforcement. 120 A
pricing structure provides for the coordinated elevation of prices or restriction in quantities
by the members of the cartel. An allocation structure provides for an agreed upon division
of the collusive gain. An enforcement structure provides for the accurate monitoring of

119

Id. at 5–22.

120

ECONOMICS OF COLLUSION, supra note 116, at 105–138.
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prices and/or quantities by the members of the cartel as well as the specification of the
negative consequence for intentionally cheating on the cartel agreement.
Second—external actor adjustment. Let’s return to PFF and consider what effects a
successful cartel will have on the market. Even if the perimeter forces in PFF were not a
threat to the profitability of the relevant market before explicit collusion, as a cartel elevates
profits, perimeter forces may place a greater strain on cartel participants: increased profits
will lure new entrants, spur buyers to be more aggressive in bargaining on price, and induce
buyers to seek out substitute products. Increased industry profits may also induce suppliers
with bargaining power to use that power to extract some of the incremental profits of the
cartel through higher factor input prices. 121 In addition, if the cartel is not all-inclusive of
firms in the market, then the non-cartel firms will seek to undercut cartel pricing and
increase their own market shares, thereby freeriding on the protective pricing umbrella of
the cartel and cutting away at its price stability.
B. The Comparative Advantage of Serial Colluders in Cartel Management
All effective cartels confront these internal challenges. First-time colluders lack
experience on how to deal with these issues and thus may settle for only modest profit
elevation from their cartels. Further, cartel firms that make only a single product or that are
only colluding in a single product market will be forced to address these issues within the
stovepipe of that single market cartel. However, large multi-product firms that are, and
have been, managing a portfolio of cartels are in a fundamentally better position to
implement and maintain their cartel. There are several reasons that serial colluders stand at
an advantage:
● Serial colluders are experienced at initiating and managing cartels. This experience
matters in terms of the effectiveness of any cartel, as well as keeping it clandestine
from buyers and avoiding detection by enforcement authorities. 122
● Serial colluders have lots of cartel-specific internal human capital embodied in
senior managers who have run successful cartels in the earlier parts of their careers.
121

Id. at 151.
Modern antitrust policy relies heavily on leniency and other innovations in detection. Antitrust
enforcement authorities seem to perceive that such measures have greatly impaired explicit collusion. In our
122
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Senior managers who are experienced at initiating and managing cartels are familiar
with how to address the issues associated with the consequent relative weakening
of the perimeter forces from effective explicit collusion. Senior managers with
cartel-specific human capital have existing relationships with their counterparts at
other serial colluders.
● Serial colluders have gained an understanding about which firms are likely to be
reliable, trustworthy partners in collusive schemes, thus can choose effective cartel
partners with limited risk of cartel defection.
● Serial colluders may have acquired experience by virtue of past law enforcement
inquiries about how to anticipate and respond to antitrust investigations and
lawsuits, thereby lessening the threat of agency enforcement.
By contrast, first time colluders, and/or smaller firms that are managing a single cartel do
not enjoy these advantages.
In support of the comparative advantage that serial colluders enjoy when architecting
or enforcing a cartel, we present three strands of evidence from the chemical industry. First,
serial colluders in the chemical industry are familiar with common facilitating practices,
such as organizing cartel activity through a neutral middleman. Each of the serial colluders
in the chemical industry has used the services of Fides/AC Treuhand to facilitate the
explicit collusion structures in at least one of the cartels that they participated in.
Knowledge of the cartel facilitation services provided by Fides/AC Treuhand, and the
ability to access those services, is inconsistent with the rogue division manager scenario
and consistent with the portfolio of cartels/business model scenario. First-time cartel
participants might not be aware of market actors like Fides/AC Treuhand, thus may take
on excess costs and risks to stand up a cartel.
Second, serial colluders in the chemical industry are familiar with cartel exit and realignment strategies. In the midst of several chemical industry cartel periods, some firms

view, the enforcement community’s confidence in the effectiveness of leniency underestimates the
adaptability and ingenuity of cartel firms. In particular, we find serial colluders to be enormously creative in
addressing a myriad of cartel issues and using enforcement “innovations” to their advantage, if it is at all
possible to do so. See, e.g., Leslie M. Marx et al., Antitrust Leniency with Multiproduct Colluders, 7 AM.
ECON. J. 205 (2015).
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exited by selling their product division to another firm that would continue to participate
in the cartel. To exit a cartel when high profits are being earned and antitrust liability
already exists is inconsistent with the rogue division manager scenario and consistent with
the management of a portfolio of cartels. In particular, this conduct suggests that firms may
be exiting one cartel and having their entry into other cartels accommodated.
Third, serial colluders in the chemical industry are familiar with mechanisms to punish
troubling fringe parties in order to preserve cartel profits. Firms have applied for amnesty
to signal to smaller cartel participants across their portfolio of cartels that they will not
tolerate deviant conduct. 123 Again, this is inconsistent with a rogue division manager
scenario and consistent with a serial colluder running a portfolio of cartels.
In sum, the chemical industry example suggests that serial colluders stand at an
advantage to their peers when it comes to maintaining and managing a cartel. This
advantage is only magnified in the multi-product context. Next, we discuss how patents
and patent licensing fit into cartel maintenance.
C. Serial Colluders Using Patents to Manage Their Portfolio of Cartels
How do patents and patent licensing help a serial colluder manage a portfolio of cartels?
When viewed solely in the context of a single cartel, a surge in patent activity from the preplea to the plea period can create a substantial entry barrier for non-cartel firms regardless
of whether the cartel firm is a serial colluder. By comparison, the surge in patent activity
by non-producing serial colluders is a phenomenon that may play a unique role in the
context of serial collusion. At a high level, patent licensing strategies can assist cartels in
making investments that sustain the structures necessary for the success of a collusive
scheme. The investments that serial colluders might make to enhance industry-wide profits
are likely to occur to a much fuller extent when serial colluders generate patents and patent
licenses across a range of products. By contrast, firms might underinvest in such activities

123
If firms A and B participate in cartels in both markets 1 and 2, and if firm B defected from the
cartel agreement in market 2, then firm A could punish firm B, by disclosing the market 1 cartel to
enforcement authorities and applying for amnesty. Firm B would likely suffer from sanctions resulting
from enforcement in market 1. Firm A might take this step if collusive profit in market 1 is small compared
to collusive profit in market 2, especially if firm A thinks firm B and other potential defectors will be
deterred from further cheating in market 2. Serial Collusion, supra note 14, at 334–36.
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if they treat each cartel as a stovepipe. Thus, where serial colluders are managing a portfolio
of cartels, we would expect that there will be much more investment in these profit
enhancing actions. 124
Additionally, serial colluders, being experienced at cartel activity and wanting to
facilitate the management of a portfolio of cartels, likely see other advantages from a surge
in patent activity in products that they make. These potential advantages are best
understood when viewed through the lens of PFF and the three cartel structures:
● Serial colluders can use patents and patent licenses to keep smaller cartel
participants “in line.” A smaller cartel participant will often chisel on the cartel’s
allocation structure as it tries to incrementally increase its share of the collusive
gain. Serial colluders can restrain this conduct by generating a large number of
patents, licensing to the smaller cartel firm, and then controlling it through the terms
of that license agreement. Note that the smaller firm may be colluding with the
serial colluders in a few other products, and the license agreement could cover a
range of products where the serial colluders have leverage over the smaller cartel
firm.
● Serial colluders can use patents and patent licenses to coerce non-cartel rivals to
join a cartel or to drive them out of the market. A smaller firm that does not want
to join a cartel can be a substantial irritant to serial colluders. Serial colluders can
surge patents in a number of products made by the smaller firm, where membership
in the cartel is essential for the smaller firm to obtain the relevant patent license
agreements. Note that for serial colluders, leverage may come from patents
124
Our analysis on this point is informed in part by review of judicial decisions that describe how
successful, long-lived, single object collusive schemes have used patent licenses to establish broad, durable
control over an industry, and thus motivated cartel participants to invest more heavily in activities that
increase the effectiveness of their illegal collaboration. One sees a breadth of vision and ambition that is
missing in one-shot collusion scenarios. For example, in 1943, the DOJ brought civil charges against National
Lead and DuPont for conspiring to restrain trade and monopolize the market for titanium dioxide. In United
States v. National Lead Co., the Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s finding that the defendants “have
utilized their patents which relate to the manufacture and use of titanium pigments and compounds to control
and regulate the manufacture and sale of titanium pigments and compounds in the United States [and] . . .
have done so throughout the rest of the world.” 332 U.S. 319, 328 (1947). The Court endorsed the trial court’s
conclusion that the defendants’ patents “through the agreements in which they are enmeshed and the manner
in which they have been used, have, in fact, been forged into instruments of domination of an entire industry.”
Id. The Court also endorsed the trial court’s additional finding that the exchange of patents between National
Lead and DuPont “bec[ame] an instrument of restraint, available for use and used, to continue the mastery of
the market” which the two firms “achieved by means of the illegal international agreement.” Id.
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obtained in products made by the smaller firm but not a product in which the serial
colluders have a cartel.
● Serial colluders can use patents and patent licenses to encumber entry and thwart
capacity expansion by non-cartel firms. In contrast to single product colluders,
serial colluders can attack a potential entrant on several different product fronts.125
Serial colluders may also bar expansion for existing firms looking to implement a
new technology or process as part of its expansion strategy.
● Serial colluders can use patents and patent licenses to create a fictitious
competitor, leading buyers to believe that the competitive process is policing the
market. A serial colluder may invite a frequent co-conspirator to enter a product
market so that production in that market now appears to be a duopoly. To do so, the
original monopolist could offer to license its patent technology to the “new entrant.”
This entry may put the minds of regulators and buyers at ease, because now there
appears to be “competition.” And, new entrants may stay out of the market instead
of trying to compete for smaller portions of market share.
● Serial colluders can use patents related to substitute goods to limit the proliferation
of these goods. Serial colluders can potentially identify substitute products and
generate a large number of patents that relate to these products in order to prevent
substitute product manufacturers from being effective competitors. Serial colluders
can also use patents to stymie expansion in the substitute product space.
● Serial colluders can use patents on the processes to make factor inputs for a
cartelized product to thwart the bargaining power of suppliers, regardless of any
intent to manufacture or sell upstream inputs. Serial colluders can generate patents
on factor inputs and use these patents as leverage to secure better terms from

125
A number of cases involving single-object colluders have identified how cartel members use
patent infringement cases to deter entry. For example, in United States v. Singer Manufacturing Co., 374
U.S. 174 (1963), a Swiss firm assigned its American patent to an American licensee (Singer) to facilitate a
lawsuit against an alleged infringing Japanese producer. The DOJ contended that the licensing agreement
between the Swiss and American firm sought to prevent Japanese imports from entering the United States.
Id. at 176–78, 189. The Supreme Court agreed and concluded that it was unreasonable for Singer and its
Swiss counterpart to cooperate in seeking to forestall a rival’s entry into the U.S. market. Id. at 195–97.
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suppliers. In this way, serial colluders can mitigate supplier bargaining power and
deter new entry.
● Serial colluders can use patent licenses to implement intrafirm cartel restrictions
by, for example, each cartel firm instructing its sales force to emphasize “price
before volume” so as to be in compliance with the terms of patent license
agreements. How does a cartel firm comply with the cartel structures while not
broadly informing its employees that the firm is a member of a cartel? Patent license
agreements with other cartel firms provide a marvelous avenue for alleviating this
issue. Consider for example the change in incentives for the sales force of a cartel
firm from the pursuit of market share strategy before entering the cartel to a “price
before volume” strategy at the inception of the cartel. Through adopting a “price
before volume” term in a patent licensing agreement, managers responsible for
running a cartel do not have to disclose the cartel to other employees. Instead, they
can simply inform the sales force that new patent licensing agreement mandates
incremental constraints on what the sales force can do to pitch new accounts. Other
constraints can be similarly adopted through patent agreements, such as terms that
state specific territories or customers are off limits to a sales force. Simply put, new
incremental patent licensing agreements can be used to solve intrafirm
communication issues without raising internal compliance red flags.
● Serial colluders can use their patent portfolios to facilitate discussions regarding
cartel issues. It ordinarily would be highly risky for senior managers at rival firms
to meet to discuss cartel issues like output, pricing, or cheating by other cartel
participants. However, there is at least a pretense of legality when managers at rival
firms meet to discuss their patents and patent licensing agreements, permitting
colluders to use these negotiations to facilitate cartel communications. Further, as
a given firm looks over its portfolio of cartels, it might be having issues with a
specific firm that is a member of several of their cartels, but this firm’s involvement
is not as ubiquitous as that of their serial colluding co-conspirators. Resolving the
cartel issues associated with this smaller cartel participant can potentially be
addressed across a number of cartels. For example, a serial colluder may want to
suggest that another serial colluder exit a specific cartel by ceasing production of
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the product, allowing the expansion of the smaller cartel firm, and compensate the
exiting serial colluding firm by accommodating their entry or expansion in another
cartelized product. The discussion of this kind of reorganization of cartel conduct
within the cartel portfolio of each firm can be done with apparent legality through
the discussion of patent licenses as well.
● Non-producing serial colluders can use patent license agreements to reduce the
price they pay for the cartel product of other serial colluders. Serial colluding nonproducers are likely aware of the portfolio of cartels that other serial colluders are
operating. A non-producer may be a purchaser of the product made by the cartel
firms, but the non-producer wants to pay non-cartel prices for the product. It may
be difficult for cartel firms to justify within their firm, as well as to third parties,
why a specific firm received special pricing on a product when others were paying
a considerably higher price. Patent licenses by the non-producer can resolve this
issue. Specifically, the non-producer will nominally pay the cartel firms the higher
cartel price, but their net price will be a non-cartel price as a consequence of the
licensing payments made by the cartel firms to the serial colluder non-producer.
● Serial colluders can use patents to redirect potential entrants by surging patents in
some cartel products but not others. Although patents can be used as an entry
deterrent by almost any cartel firm, serial colluders can surge patents in a number
of products that redirect entry ambitions of smaller firms in a direction that better
suits the collusive profits of the serial colluders. Suppose a smaller potential entrant
has the potential capacity to enter the market for products 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 and
believes ex ante that entry is equally profitable in each of these products. Suppose
serial colluders have all of these products in the portfolio of cartels, but the serial
colluders realize that entry would have the most serious negative impact on cartel
profits for products 1, 2, 3, and 4. Then the serial colluding firms would surge
patents in products 1, 2, 3, and 4, while leaving product 5 without a surge of patent
activity. Essentially, the serial colluders are inviting the entry effort to be directed
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at product 5. 126 This kind of activity by serial colluders that are managing a
portfolio of cartels can be undertaken with apparent legality as part of discussions
regarding patent activity and patent licensing. Note that if the cartel had issues
managing product 5 because of a difficult, smaller cartel member who was regularly
cheating on the cartel agreement, then leaving product 5 relatively exposed to a
threat of entry might be an effective punishment for that firm.
● Serial colluders can use patent licenses to organize coordination via a neutral third
party, like several chemical industry participants did with Fides/AC Treuhand.
Although we have already noted that patent licensing is unlikely to replace the
myriad of communications and actions needed to manage a given cartel on a regular
basis, patent licensing does have the potential to implement cartel structures.
Suppose two serial colluders are the sole makers of a product. The two cartel firms
recognize the need to monitor one another but neither firm wants the other in their
production facility, talking to their employees, and potentially trying to recruit away
top talent. A serial colluder non-producer with patent license agreements with each
firm, where the license agreements contain audit provisions, may provide a solution
to the monitoring dilemma. The two cartel firms would thus benefit from an outside
facilitator to assist with a number of cartel activities, in much the same way that
Fides/AC Treuhand provided such assistance to many cartels.
IV.

MODERNIZING ANTITRUST DOCTRINE RELATED TO PATENTS AND
PRICE FIXING IN RESPONSE TO THE THREAT OF SERIAL COLLUSION
In this Section, we describe how antitrust law, outside of the pay-for-delay context,

handles allegations of price fixing when patents are involved. A core objective of antitrust
law is to deter and punish price-fixing cartels to allow for market output and prices to be
set via competition. As we explained above, the label “price fixing” applies to naked
agreements to set minimum prices; restrict output; and divide markets by customer,
product, or territory. A per se rule against price fixing was advanced early in the twentieth

126

The scenario described is consistent with the behavior of German chemical companies in the
1920s and 1930s, as described in Kronstein’s study of cartelization in Germany before World War II.
Dynamics of German Cartels, supra note 26, at 664–71.
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century and solidified by the middle of the century in its current form. 127 The logic of per
se condemnation for horizontal restraints—such as price fixing, output restrictions, and the
allocation of geographic sales territories or customers—is that these types of behavior harm
competition in the vast majority of cases without offering redeeming procompetitive
benefits. 128 The threshold inquiry for courts in analyzing agreements challenged as illegal
trade restraints is to characterize the conduct as either suitable for summary condemnation
or worthy of a more elaborate reasonableness assessment. 129 However, because patent
licensing often serves benign or procompetitive purposes, the characterization process can
be more difficult when patent licenses are inserted into the fact pattern. 130
From 1900 to 1950, a number of cases challenging patent licensing arrangements as
horizontal price fixing came before the courts. Some treated the contested arrangements
leniently. 131 In 1926, in an extreme decision recounted above, 132 the Supreme Court
permitted General Electric to use a patent license to impose price limitations on its rival
(Westinghouse) for the sale of light bulbs making use of its patented technology. 133 Some
127

William E. Kovacic, The Future Adaptation of the Per Se Rule of Illegality in U.S. Antitrust Law,
2021 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) [hereinafter Future Adaptation]. The principal landmark case
defining this development in the courts is Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. United States, 310 U.S. 150 (1940),
which held that agreements to set prices were subject to summary condemnation without regard to their actual
market effects. Id. at 223–24 & n.59.
128

Future Adaptation, supra note 127. See also N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5
(1958) (“This principle of per se condemnation not only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by
the Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an
incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry involved,
as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been
unreasonable—an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.”).
129

Future Adaptation, supra note 127. See also Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc.,
441 U.S. 1, 19–21 (1979).
130

Behavior with cognizable, plausible efficiency justifications ordinarily receives a more elaborate
inquiry, as part of a “quick look” or fuller rule of reason analysis, to test its actual or likely competitive
effects. Future Adaptation, supra note 127. See also Calif. Dental Assoc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S.
758, 769–71, 779–81 (1999). Despite the complexities of some patent licensing scenarios, the courts have
indicated that the presence of patent licenses does not preclude per se condemnation for efforts by rivals to
set prices or output levels, or to allocate sales territories or customers. Ginsburg et al., supra note 93, at 105–
06; DOJ/FTC IP GUIDELINES, supra note 72, at 17.
131

See supra Section II.A (describing Supreme Court decisions that gave permissive treatment to
licensing arrangements with arguably horizontal price-fixing effects).
132

United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).

133

Some commentators have concluded that the Court treated GE’s behavior as “essentially
unilateral.” HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF THE APPLICATION OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 31–39 (3d ed. 2019) [hereinafter IP AND
ANTITRUST].
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scholars describe the General Electric rule as approaching total immunity from per se
illegality: “GE does not authorize rule of reason treatment for price-fixing arrangements.
Rather, it creates what amounts to an immunity for restraints that fall within its domain,
and generally leaves naked price fixing falling outside that domain to per se
condemnation.” 134
Over time, the Supreme Court developed a more nuanced approach as it gained more
experience with questionable patent licenses and apparent price fixing not closely related
to innovation. Courts have tended to accord fuller rule of reason treatment to restrictions
imposed by individual licensors upon individual licensees, even though the restrictions set
the licensee’s prices or output levels, or limit the licensee’s sales territories or customers
to which it can sell. 135 It appears that patent owners have the most leniency to create
licensing agreements that may restrain competition when they appear to be acting
individually to advance their own self-interest to recover their investment costs, and not as
part of a larger plan with multiple rivals to cartelize a sector. Hovenkamp and his colleagues
observe that, “the courts have generally been tolerant of horizontal output limitations in
intellectual property licenses, at least when the restriction was imposed by the licensor on
each licensee individually and there was no proof of an output limitation agreement among
the licensees themselves.” 136 Firms lose the protection of General Electric, and per se
condemnation is more likely, where multiple rival firms have imposed the licensing
restriction or participated in pooling arrangements, 137 or the patent license is determined to
be a pretense for collusion—e.g., if the patent covers minor or irrelevant technology, the
patent is invalid, or there is a cheap and easy substitute technology not covered by the
patent. 138 This imprecise set of rules governing the patent license and antitrust intersection

134

Id.

135

See supra Section III.A (describing the narrowed interpretation of General Electric in subsequent
Supreme Court decisions).
136

IP AND ANTITRUST, supra note 133, at 32–33.

137

In cases such as Hartford Empire, the courts have found output restrictions illegal in the context
of patent pools, or cross-licenses, and in cases in which it appeared that the licensees sought the restrictions.
See Section II.A.
138

Id. “GE is limited to cases where the patentee licenses [to] a manufacturer to manufacture the
patented product and the patent covers all or a ‘significant’ proportion of the resulting product.” IP AND
ANTITRUST, supra note 133, at 31–35.
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creates two major analytical challenges for courts in cartel enforcement cases: (1) when
should a license be characterized as mainly horizontal, and (2) how does an antitrust court
know if licensed patents are weak and the license is a pretense?
A. Priest’s Approach to Evaluating Competitive Effects in Patent Licensing: A
Patentee / Licensee Rents Analysis
George Priest’s still-influential commentary on patent licensing, published 40 years
ago, recounted the intricate pattern of how industries sometimes shift away from healthy
competition in prices and innovation toward collusion. 139 It may be hard to detect this
transition because patent licenses provide good cover for collusive agreement. Priest
responded to this challenge by developing a test rooted in economic theory to determine
whether a patent license is pro or anticompetitive, through analyzing relative rents in patent
licensing agreements. Priest also criticized some of the alternative tests that had been used
by courts, which focused on intent information and patent strength. While Priest’s approach
is attractive for offering a unified treatment of liability and may be useful in the single
market context, his analysis did not account for the properties of serial collusion. As
demonstrated below, the approach is unlikely to be useful in the serial collusion context.
Priest approached the two questions posed above regarding antitrust enforcement in the
patent license context by focusing on the flow of patent-based rents and designing what we
call a “rents test.” 140 Priest reasoned that if a patent is strong and the patent owner acts in
his own self-interest, then he likely captures most of the value from his patent licenses. On
the other hand, if the patent is weak and the patent owner acts in part at the behest of the
licensees to help them organize a cartel, then the flow of licensing rents to the licensor
would be relatively modest. 141 When subject to antitrust review, Priest argued that the

139

Priest, supra note 6.

140
Priest also looked at price changes in response to the introduction of the patent license. Eswaran
explains that Priest “proposes that if the cross-licensing of competing patents ends up raising the prices of
the products, the arrangement should be rendered illegal.” Mukesh Eswaran, Cross-Licensing of Competing
Patents as a Facilitating Device, 27 CAN. J. ECON. 689, 704 (1994). Eswaran adds “[This test] is unlikely to
be effective in practice. Firms contemplating cross-licensing could easily contrive a drastic but temporary
increase in prices prior to the agreement and lower [them] slightly after the agreement becomes formal . . . .”
Id.
141

Professors Joseph F. Brodley and Maureen A. O’Rourke offer this interpretation of Priest’s

approach:
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former type of agreements should be permitted but the latter should be struck down. Priest
discounted the use of intent information in more traditional analysis undertaken by courts
for being unreliable, and information about the importance of the patented technology, i.e.,
patent “strength,” as too costly and difficult for courts to evaluate.
Yet, while Priest’s approach is useful for evaluating collusion in a single market
context, his proposed framework fails to consider the competitive dynamics and collusive
schemes of serial colluders. We argue that when the focus shifts to serial collusion, Priest’s
rents test fails, and other possible frameworks that consider patentee and licensee intent
and patent strength deserve more consideration.
We illustrate the general approach suggested by Priest with the following hypothetical.
Suppose firms A and B compete vigorously in market 1, enjoying equal market share and
equal efficiency, but neither is reaping any economic profit. Suppose now firm A achieves
a drastic invention and gets a patent that would allow it to drive firm B out of market 1.142
Firm A, acting as a monopolist, can sell to half of the original market for a profit of 5 or
sell to the entire market for a profit of 8. 143 Alternatively, firm A could cooperate with firm
B and boost the total profit to 10. 144 Suppose the firms agree to both use the new invention
and continue selling to their current customers, and firm B agrees to pay a lump sum patent
royalty of 4 to firm A. Then, firm A gets a profit of 5 from selling to its half of the market
plus 4 from the royalty, and firm B gets a profit of 5 from selling to its half of the market

Priest would confirm the cartel diagnosis by examining changes in price, output, and
market share, particularly in response to variations in manufacturing costs. Stability of
market shares, output, and price tend to indicate a cartel. A cartel manager would try to
hold prices and market shares stable, and maintain a price umbrella over less efficient firms
to avoid the disruptions and shocks that can undermine the cartel. On the other hand, a
patent monopolist will seek to induce competition at the licensee level, which leads to
changing market shares, fluctuations in price as manufacturing costs increase or decrease,
and exit of less efficient firms.
Joseph F. Brodley & Maureen A. O’Rourke, Patent Settlement Agreements, 16 ANTITRUST 53, 56 (2002)
[hereinafter Patent Settlement Agreements].
142

Economists use the term “drastic” for process innovations that reduce marginal cost so much that
a firm using a drastic innovation can cut its price low enough to drive out competitors, and in some cases still
enjoy the benefits of a monopoly price. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 390–
92 (1988).
143

Here, we are assuming that firm A’s cost of production jumps up if its output rises above 5.

144

We assume total cost is lower and profit is greater if A and B share production and A’s facilities
are not strained by an increase in output above 5.
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minus 4 from the royalty. The relatively large royalty payment from B to A reflects the
market power created by A’s patent.
Now consider a similar hypothetical in which firm A’s invention is trivial and the patent
license is simply a tool to divide the market. By assumption, firm A derives no market
power from the patent because it has no ability to exclude firm B. That said, through use
of a patent licensing agreement, the firms could divide the market with each firm limiting
their sales to their current customers. Let’s assume the total monopoly profit with the old
technology is 6 and thus each firm gets a profit of 3 from the collusive agreement. 145 Now,
however, the license payment would be trivial, and each firm would earn half of the
monopoly profit in market 1.
Comparing the two hypotheticals, Priest would note that a license associated with a
legitimate patent leads to a significantly higher royalty payment of 4, and dissimilar profits
of 9 and 1 for firms A and B, respectively. By contrast, when the license is used purely for
collusion, the royalty payment from B to A is trivial, and the profits of the two firms are
the same at 3. Priest describes this sort of investigation into the rent split across patent
licensing participants as a valuable test for distinguishing “good” from “bad” patent
licenses in terms of their likely competitive effects and social utility.
While Priest’s approach makes sense if we consider one market in isolation, it fails
when firms compete in more than one market and use patent licenses to control both
markets. We start with a hypothetical similar to our first, in which firm A achieves a drastic
invention in market 1, but now firm B also achieves a drastic invention in market 2. Firm
A and firm B compete in both markets. Once again, we assume that the inventors can use
their patents to achieve a monopoly in their respective markets, but in the multi-market
context, it would be more efficient for the two firms to license to their competitor and share
the markets equally. 146 As before, firm B could make a license payment of 4 to firm A for
the invention it needs in market 1. Similarly, firm A could make a license payment of 4 to
firm B to use the invention it needs to compete in market 2. Of course, since the two license

145

We assume that the joint monopoly profit of 6 is less than the joint monopoly profit of 10 that
flowed from the drastic process innovation.
146

As before, we assume that sharing the market equally leads to more efficient production because
firms avoid straining their production capacity.
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payments are a wash, the firms could instead simply grant royalty-free cross licenses to
each other. So, this result already looks quite dissimilar to the single market context, as the
rent split across patent participants appears de minimis but actually reflects a mutual
exchange for value. By contrast, if we suppose instead that the two inventions are both
trivial and the firms are simply using the patents to implement a collusive cross-license,
they could also set the royalties at zero, divide the markets, and equally share in the
monopoly profit in markets 1 and 2. This result on the surface looks the same as the mutual
exchange for value, but the competitive effects and social benefits of the two exchanges
are starkly different.
In sum, while Priest’s rents test may be a valuable tool for evaluating patent licensing
in the single market context, it is less helpful in the serial colluder context. When two
markets or products are involved, we can no longer look to the amount of patent royalties
or the resulting profitability of the two firms from a licensing agreement to determine
whether the license is likely to be procompetitive or collusive. Instead, mutual exchanges
for value and collusive dealing may look very similar; small exchanges in royalties may
reflect a mutual exchange or a pretextual, sham deal to divide a market or customers. 147
B. Reevaluating the Traditional Approach to Analyzing Competitive Effects in
Patent Licensing: An Intent-Based Analysis or Analysis of Patent Strength
The traditional approach used by courts to rein in the anticompetitive effect of licensing
deals often relies on evidence of downstream licensees’ intent to control license terms, or
evidence that the patent covers a minor technology or is likely invalid or uninfringed. 148
Courts may also try to analyze the strength of a patent from objective information about

147

Moreover, the Priest approach may induce enforcement agencies and courts to mistakenly
characterize a horizontal licensing agreement as vertical. Suppose firm B offers a patent license that facilitates
collusion in market 1 by firms A and C, while A and B rely on a patent license from C to help them collude
in market 2, and B and C rely on a patent license from A to help them collude in market 3. When there is a
risk of serial collusion, it may be dangerous to accept at face value the claim that a patent license is vertical
just because the licensor does not produce the product made by the licensees.
148

See IP AND ANTITRUST, supra note 133, at §§ 31.21, 31.26, 33.15, and 33.38; MacGregor v.
Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. 329 U.S. 402, 407 (1947) (“If it be determined on remand that the patent is
invalid, there is no question but that, as MacGregor contends, the price-fixing agreement violates the antitrust laws.”) In the patent settlement context, Hovenkamp observes that antitrust courts avoid the difficult
question of whether a patent is valid and infringed by instead asking whether it is “’obviously’ invalid or
very weak.” Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason and the Scope of the Patent, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
515, 541 (2015).
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the patented technology, such as through testimony from expert witnesses and other
sources. As previously noted, Priest distrusts intent evidence because he considers it
unreliable, 149 and he disapproves of an inquiry into the merits of a patent in the context of
an antitrust trial—he argues this inquiry is too difficult. 150 Subsequent commentators,
especially in the Actavis context, also worry about error costs from undertaking this
analysis. They fear that aggressive enforcement against cartels implemented via patent
licenses will chill research and development, and that those costs are greater than the social
costs of under-deterred collusion. 151
It is certainly true that intent evidence is noisy and that courts and parties will face
increased costs in terms of time and resources from placing greater reliance on whether
defendants had knowledge of patent weakness or undertaking an on the merits inquiry into
the strength of patents. Yet, we perceive that courts and commentators have exaggerated
the potential harm of chilling research and development from these inquiries and ignored
their value in identifying price fixing. 152 Furthermore, “[c]ourts regularly litigate patent
issues within antitrust cases that involve allegations of sham litigation or allegations that a
patent was procured by fraud. Courts also regularly conduct ‘mini-trials’ in legal
malpractice cases involving patent issues such as when a patent is invalidated due to a
lawyer's alleged incompetence.”

153

Thus, courts appear to have the institutional

competence to manage a trial within a trial if need be.

149

Priest, supra note 6, at 312–13.

150

Id. at 309, 333.
See e.g., Melissa J. Hatch & Robin Sumner, United States: A Turducken Task: How Actavis
Invites Relitigation of Patent Merits, (Dec. 12, 2013),
https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/patent/280776/a-turducken-task-how-actavis-invites-relitigation-ofpatent-merits; Adam Mossoff, et al., How Antitrust Overreach is Threatening Healthcare Innovation,
FEDERALIST SOCIETY: REGULATORY TRANSPARENCY PROJECT (Jan. 28, 2019), https://regproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/RTP-Intellectual-Property-Working-Group-Paper-Drug-Patents.pdf.
152
For a discussion of the costs and benefits of analysis of intent in price fixing cases, see Ronald
A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 657, 666–70 (2001). Michael Carrier
acknowledges that intent inquiries create both false positives and false negatives but is critical of “blind
deference to the patent system.” Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 761, 764 (2002).
151

153

Joshua B. Fischman, The Circular Logic of Actavis, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 9, 140–41 (2016). For
non-patent trials addressing patent strength, see, for example, Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013)
(legal malpractice); Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172
(1965) (Section 2 claims involving fraud in procuring a patent); and Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc.
v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993) (sham copyright suit and Sherman Act Sections 1 and 2
claims).
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C. Charting a Way Forward to Evaluating Patents in Antitrust Suits: Rigorous
Analysis in the Serial Collusion Context
We admire the elegance of the Priest test in the context of isolated cartels, but we also
believe that Priest overstates the costs of asking antitrust courts to probe the quality of
patents, patent licenses, and patent assertions that might be used to foster collusion. Such
inquiries are essential for detection of collusion in settings where serial collusion is possible
and the Priest test is apt to be ineffective. Moreover, rigorous antitrust review of patents
does not threaten innovation to the extent that detractors warn.
Commentators who favor deferential antitrust review of patent licensing often
exaggerate the importance of patents as a source of innovative incentive, 154 and underplay
patents’ potential for competitive harm. Surveys of most research and development
managers rate patents as the fourth or fifth most important method of appropriating value
from inventions, the exception being the pharmaceutical context where patents rank first.
Further, most patents cover minor and relatively obvious inventions. About 60% of the
patents granted on chemicals are not renewed to their full term, suggesting the advances
achieved in these patents may not be significant. 155 This is no surprise; many patents are
obtained for reasons other than blocking imitation, like gaining bargaining power in
lawsuits, license negotiations, or impressing investors. 156 In addition, there are other means

154

Empirical evidence suggests that patent incentives have little impact on innovation with the
exception of pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, medical instruments, “and possibly specialty chemicals.”
Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, Recent Research on the Economics of Patents, 4 ANN. REV. ECON.
541, 548 (2012). See also Michael A. Klein, Secrecy, The Patent Puzzle and Endogenous Growth, 126
EUROPEAN ECON. REV. 1, 1 (2020) [hereinafter Patent Puzzle]. Klein summarizes findings of various
empirical studies that find weak or no connection between the strengthening of patent regimes and increases
in innovation, noting that empirical studies “find strong evidence that strengthening the patent regime
increases . . . patenting!” Id. Klein adds: “First, firms routinely decide not to patent their innovations. Surveys
of European and U.S. firms find that the average propensity to patent is between 30–55%. Second, firms
widely consider secrecy to be a more effective appropriation mechanism than patents.” Id. at 2.
155

Carlos J. Serrano, The Dynamics of the Transfer and Renewal of Patents, 41 RAND J. ECON.
686, 693 (2010).
156

Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and
Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 25 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 7552,
2000) [hereinafter Intellectual Assets] (“One broader use of patents observed particularly in chemical (apart
from drugs) and other discrete product industries is their combination to build patent fences around some
patented core invention. Such fence building involves the patenting, though not licensing (nor necessarily
even commercializing), of variants and other inventions that might substitute for the core innovation in order
to preempt rivals from introducing competing innovations.”). See also Patent Puzzle, supra note 154, at 2
(“When firms do patent, it is often for reasons other than protecting their innovation from imitation as
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to protect intellectual property outside the patent system. Trade secrecy is the favored
method of obtaining value from process inventions in the chemical industry and other
sectors. 157 And of course, the risks to innovative incentives must be balanced against the
social costs of serial collusion, which has not been adequately deterred thus far.
Further, a more rigorous evaluation is especially important in the serial collusion
context. There is good reason to believe that the patent portfolios built by serial colluders
like those in the chemical industry contain many weak patents, patents that are likely
invalid, and/or patents covering technology that is unlikely to be commercialized.
Presumably, when firms compete in industries like the chemical industry, they have an
incentive to challenge weak patents for invalidity in opposition proceedings in Europe and
Japan, inter partes review at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), and
declaratory judgment proceedings in U.S. federal courts. Yet, these kinds of challenges
tend to disappear when competitors cooperate in serial cartels. 158 The colluding firms are
likely to move in the opposite direction by settling patent litigation or validity
challenges. 159 These agreements may then include no-challenge clauses in patent licenses
that discourage parties from monitoring patent quality and challenging weak patents. 160 As
typically assumed. . . . In particular, patents are increasingly used strategically for their ‘blocking’ effect on
rival innovations.”).
157

Cohen and co-authors observe: “With regard to the protection of new processes, … [s]ecrecy is
commonly the dominant mechanism, as in the chemicals industries, semiconductors and others.” Intellectual
Assets, supra note 156, at 6. They summarize research describing “how chemical firms will sometimes
protect an innovation by applying for one or more patents on different elements of an innovation, while
keeping other elements secret.” Id. at 7. They find “for product innovations, several industries apply for
patents for more than two-thirds of their innovations, including chemicals (nec), drugs, mineral products, and
medical equipment. In contrast, there are also many industries that applied for patents on fewer than 15% of
their product innovations, including food, textiles, glass, steel and other metals.” Id. at 16 n.36.
158

Jay Pil Choi, Patent Pools and Cross-Licensing in the Shadow of Patent Litigation, 51 INT’L
ECON. REV. 441, 458–59 (2010) (“[patent pools] can have the effect of sheltering invalid patents from
challenges” and contribute to an environment in which there is a “serious lack of private incentives to weed
out patents of suspect value through litigation.”).
159
The existence of a cartel that is made possible (or facilitated) by a patent license discourages
licensees from inventing around or challenging the patent. See United States v. Masonite, 316 U.S. 265, 281
(1942). As noted above, many patent-licensing/price fixing cases in the first half of the twentieth century
involved settlement of patent litigation. Supra section I.A.
160

Licensing of IP Rights, supra note 96, at 23 (“A no-challenge clause imposes direct or indirect
obligations not to challenge the validity of the licensor’s intellectual property right. Such clauses may conflict
with the overriding interest of ensuring that IP rights are lawful. Invalid intellectual property rights should
be eliminated because [they] stifle[] innovation rather than promoting it. Since licensees are often the parties
with the greatest technical ability and economic incentive to challenge improperly granted IP rights, it is
appropriate to impose limitations on no-challenge clauses.”).
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a result, weak patents and collusive schemes proliferate, blocking entry for new
competitors and expansion by existing rivals.
V.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
There is strong deference in the law to the protection of intellectual property and

monopoly rents associated with innovation. Sophisticated cartels can capitalize on this
deference. Our finding that patents increased from the pre-plea to the plea period and then
again from the plea to the post-plea period for chemical firms that have been found to have
regularly participated in cartels implies that firms are using patents to enhance the profits
of their conspiracies. These patent surges may be facilitating cartel structures or may be
harming both non-cartel firms and potential entrants. The surge in patents from the preplea to the plea period by non-producers that are among the most active cartel firms also
suggests a sophisticated use of patents to enhance the portfolio of cartels that these firms
may be running.
In an earlier article, we presented four principal policy recommendations to address the
phenomenon of serial collusion. 161 First, antitrust enforcement agencies should work with
cartel participants to carry out cartel reconstructions to help enforcement agencies learn
how each cartel worked, who was responsible, and what other markets might be affected.
Second, antitrust agencies should engage in more extensive monitoring of serial cartel
offenders, with the monitoring obligation imposed in sentencing, settlement, or plea
agreements. Third, existing leniency programs should be supplemented with bounty
programs that give company insiders monetary rewards for informing on cartels. One
major aim of such rewards would be to peel small firms away from cartels. Fourth, we
would mandate adjustments in merger review for transactions involving a serial colluder.
The revised merger control regime would mandate review of mergers from a coordinated
effects perspective whenever a serial colluder notifies an enforcement agency regarding a
merger for review.
In the balance of this paper, we supplement our previous recommendations with
proposals that emerge from our study of patent practices and serial collusion. Presented
below are a number of policy recommendations that, if implemented, would improve the
161

Serial Collusion, supra note 14.
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ability of the competition policy system to detect and deter harmful collusive schemes that
draw upon patent practices for their effectiveness.

Expanding Registration and Notification Obligations
Actavis and other pay-for-delay cases have renewed our awareness of how patent
settlements can serve anticompetitive ends. In July 2002, the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) issued a study that documented branded drug producers’ use of patent infringement
settlements to delay market entry by producers of generic equivalents. 162 The following
year, Congress passed the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization
Act, which included a requirement that the parties to such settlements provide the FTC
with a copy of their agreement. 163 Implementation of this provision has enabled the
Commission to monitor and study pay-for-delay agreements. The notification mechanism
has enhanced the FTC’s ability to track industry trends and to identify possible targets for
law enforcement intervention. 164
For patent settlements, the pay-for-delay notification obligation is the exception, not
the norm. As Joseph Brodley and Maureen O’Rourke explain, antitrust agencies do not
enjoy ready access to most patent settlement agreements:
Antitrust scrutiny of patent settlements is further constrained because patent
settlements are not disclosed to enforcement agencies. To be sure, the Patent
Act requires filing of interference settlements and collateral agreements
with the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). But it appears doubtful that
the PTO can police disclosure of collateral agreements and, under the Third
Circuit’s decision in United States v. FMC Corp., the Department of Justice
lacks standing to enforce compliance. . . . [D]efendants in settlement cases
benefit from two legal presumptions that, while legitimate in themselves,
impede antitrust challenge: a patent is presumed valid, and courts have
frequently declared that patent settlements are to be encouraged. 165
162

FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/generic-drug-entry-prior-patent(2002),
expiration-ftc-study/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf.
163

Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108173, §§ 1111-1118, 117 Stat. 2066 (Dec. 8, 2003) (creating patent settlement notification mechanism).
164

Press Release, FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC Staff Issues FY 2017 Report on Branded Drug
Firms’ Patent Settlements with Generic Competitors (Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2020/12/ftc-staff-issues-fy-2017-report-branded-drug-firms-patent
165
Patent Settlement Agreements, supra note 141, at 53.
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To close this gap, we would envision as an initial step that Congress would enact
legislation that gives the FTC authority to establish a reporting system that mandates the
disclosure to the FTC of patent settlements in infringement cases. The reporting mechanism
could be modeled upon the system, described immediately above, for reverse payment
settlements in the pharmaceutical sector. The legislation would give the FTC authority to
define categories of transactions subject to the reporting requirement. Relevant criteria for
establishing the reporting obligation might include the size of parties to the licensing
arrangement, whether licensing practices in a sector had previously been the subject of
antitrust proceedings, and other factors deemed relevant based on the experience of
antitrust agencies examining the patent system and commercial licensing practices. 166
A more ambitious program of disclosure would require the notification to the federal
antitrust agencies of a larger body of patent licensing agreements. We would support the
adoption of a new statute that delegated to the FTC the authority to promulgate rules that
define the reporting obligation. 167 A model for this process would be the machinery used
to delimit the merger reporting obligation imposed by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976. 168 Under this statute, Congress established a mandatory premerger reporting program and delegated its implementation through rulemaking and other
administrative actions to the FTC. By this mechanism, we envision the creation of a dataset
that enables the federal antitrust agencies to observe larger patterns of patenting activity.
This data would also expand agency knowledge of patent licensing behavior to inform the

166

As suggested in this paper, federal antitrust agencies have accumulated considerable knowledge
about patent-antitrust issues in the course of conducting investigations, prosecuting cases, and performing
studies. Many of these activities are described in William E. Kovacic, Intellectual Property Policy and
Competition Policy, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 421 (2011); William E. Kovacic, The Importance of
History in the Design of Competition Policy Strategy: The Federal Trade Commission and Intellectual
Property, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 319 (2007); and William E. Kovacic & Andreas P. Reindl, An
Interdisciplinary Approach to Improving Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Policy, 28 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 1002 (2004).
167

Among other tasks, the rulemaking deliberations would identify the scope of information that
various reporting thresholds might elicit and the burden associated with compliance.
168

Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, Sec. 201, §7A, 90
Stat. 1383, 1390-91 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §18a (2012)).
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development of cartel cases, as well as guide the investigation of mergers and single-firm
conduct. 169

Expanding “Super Plus Factors” to Cover Strategic Patent Surging
In earlier work, we introduced the concept of a “super plus factor.” 170 Plus factors are
economic actions and outcomes, above and beyond parallel conduct by oligopolistic firms,
that are largely inconsistent with unilateral conduct but largely consistent with explicitly
coordinated action. 171 When the conduct or outcome leads to the strong inference of
explicit collusion, then the plus factor is referred to as a super plus factor. 172 We suggest
that if there is a surge of patents by firms in an industry that have a history of colluding
with one another, and there is no such surge by firms in the industry that have no history
of explicit collusion, and each serial colluding firm is effectively refusing to license any
producer outside of the group of historical cartel participants, then this conduct should be
treated as a super plus factor. In addition, if a serial colluder that is a non-producer has a
concurrent surge in patent activity and licenses only to other serial colluders, then this
activity should be treated as a super plus factor pertaining to the involvement of the nonproducer in the cartel.
This application of super plus factors to the serial collusion context can be expanded to
further conduct as well. Suppose firm B and C operate a series of cartels together and B
has unintentionally sold beyond its agreed upon market share for product 3, while C has
undersold. A transfer needs to occur from B to C to correct the imbalance in sales for
product 3. This re-balancing can be directly handled in cash in the license agreement in
product 2, where B is licensed by C. 173 Looking at cartels in a stovepipe without
considering the portfolio of cartels run by each firm, this transfer would be completely
169

As with a reporting mechanism for the settlement of infringement disputes, the design of the
reporting system for patent licenses would draw upon the substantial experience of the federal antitrust
agencies in dealing with patent-antitrust issues. See supra note 160.
170

William E. Kovacic et al., Plus Factors and Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 393
(2012) [hereinafter Super Plus Factors].
171

Id.

172

Id. at 396–97.

173

C sues for breach of the product 2 license, or threatens to do so, and B settles for the amount
needed to “true up” the product 3 cartel.
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invisible to enforcement authorities—it is part of a private license agreement and does not
involve the product in question (product 3). Broadening of the interfirm transfer super plus
factor we identified previously to multiple products for serial colluders would be useful in
this scenario as well. 174 This is another way in which closer examination of patent licensing
by serial colluders that interact in multiple product markets can inform the identification
of conduct that suggests the existence of a collusive agreement.

Expanding Patent Misuse to Apply to Related Patents
The patent misuse doctrine states that a patent used to facilitate an antitrust violation
cannot be enforced. 175 The doctrine creates a desirable pathway for new firms to enter
markets that had been cartelized with threats of patent assertion. Courts should use their
discretion and recognize that the defense is good even for patents owned by serial colluders
who did not produce in the market in question so long as other members of the network of
serial colluders were found liable for collusion in that market. 176 This may be significant
because, as we observed in Section I, non-producers often obtain many patents on products
in cartelized markets, and they may use those patents in various ways to facilitate collusion.
Thus, any patent covering the cartel product, or some other product that was used to
facilitate the collusion, should be subject to a misuse defense by any new entrant or noncolluding firm that wants to use the “innovation.” Some may argue that this would thwart
genuine innovation in the product, but we argue that the cartel firms forfeit the monopoly
protection of patent laws when they use patents to further anticompetitive conduct.

Greater Agency Investigation of the Role of Patents in Serial Cartels.

174

Super Plus Factors, supra note 170, at 423 n.117 (“It is a relatively simple matter for firms in an
oligopoly to engage in contractual relationships with regard to a broad range of activities, many of which are
completely meaningless from a productivity standpoint, and to use allegations of contract breach, and ensuing
settlements, to legitimize cartel side payments.”).
175

This principle is embodied in the existing law of patent misuse. Revisiting Patent Misuse, supra

note 25.
176

Such an approach also would appear to involve the exercise of the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office of its existing power to rescind patents related to a patent for which the patentee made misstatements
in its application. Id.
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Today, EC decisions rarely mention patents when describing firm conduct at issue in
prohibition decisions. For the 32 chemical cartels enumerated in Appendix A, patents are
hardly mentioned in the corresponding EC decisions. 177 This is a remarkable omission
given the historically significant role of patents in price-fixing agreements. Perhaps given
scarce enforcement resources, the EC chose not to investigate cartel use of patents and
focused instead on the low-hanging fruit of amnesty applicants’ disclosures about price
targets and customer and market share agreements. Going forward, European, U.S., and
other global cartel investigators need to learn whether and what role patents play in
instances of serial collusion. We note that in recent merger inquiries, the EC’s Directorate
for Competition has taken a greater interest in patenting and patent portfolios as focal
points in merger analysis. 178 This indicates a greater willingness by enforcement agencies
to undertake the laborious process of mapping out patent portfolios and, perhaps, licensing
arrangements, as foundations for building cases beyond challenges to mergers. This is a
helpful step forward.

Liability for Cartel Facilitators
A serial colluder that is facilitating collusion in a product that they do not make should
be found liable in civil and criminal actions for collusion, just like producers. 179 In addition,
they should be subject to civil liability from private litigants in class actions and individual
suits. Liability and the determination of damages in such cases should be rooted in, at a
minimum, a but-for theory of harm: but-for the facilitating conduct of the defendant, what
would the producers have been able to accomplish through their collusion? Thus, the cartel
facilitators’ marginal harm should be traceable to them in future lawsuits. Cartel
facilitators, like Fides/AC Treuhand, have already been penalized for participation in

177

Just four of the cases listed in Appendix A—Food Flavor Enhancers, Hydrogren Periodide
(2006), Organic Peroxide, and Polypropelene—mention patents.
178

Bayer/Monsanto, Case M.8084, Merger Procedure Regulation 139/2004 (Mar. 21, 2018).

179

This comports with existing U.S. doctrine which have used a “hub-and-spoke” model to impose
civil and criminal liability on hold vertically-related firms that facilitate the operation of a price-fixing cartel.
See supra note 95 (collecting cases).
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European cartels even though Fides/AC Treuhand is not a producer of any chemical
product. 180

Creation of an Anti-Cartel Research Program Focused on Serial Collusion and the Role
of Patents in Cartel Maintenance
In this Article, we have focused mainly on the use of patents to facilitate serial
collusion in the chemical industry, but our findings are relevant to the study and
prosecution of collusion in a number of other important economic sectors. The electronics
and auto parts industries, for example, have also been racked by serial collusion in recent
years, and these are both patent-intensive industries. 181 Electronics is much like chemicals
in that the pattern of anticompetitive behavior goes back a century. It would be worthwhile
to study cartels in these industries and try to identify what role patents played. We would
also propose using the research and information-gathering authority of the FTC, under
Section 6(b) of the FTC Act, to study patent licensing. Such a study would seek to test
some of the conjectures set out in this Article and determine, as noted above, whether a
mandate that firms register patent licenses with antitrust agencies might be appropriate. 182

VI.

CONCLUSION
Over a century ago, federal antitrust enforcement began to give careful attention to the

possibility that patent licensing practices could enable rival producers to organize and
180

Unobserved Collusion, supra note 14, at 330. See also Heat Stabilisers in Appendix A at 188-

190.
181

“The German chemical company BASF participated in 21[price-fixing agreements] with 17 of
those ending in the current millennium. The French cement company Lafarge SA participated in 21 with 16
of those ending in the current millennium. The German pharmaceutical company Bayer AG participated in
20 with 5 of those ending in the current millennium. The Japanese conglomerate Hitachi Ltd. participated in
20 with 18 of those ending in the current millennium.” Serial Collusion, supra note 14, at 22 n.22. Marvao
describes the problem of serial collusion “in the manufacture of transport and electrical equipment.” Id.
182

The Final TNEC Report contained the following recommendation regarding the notification to
the government of patent licenses:
Recording of transfers and agreements.–We recommend that any sale, license,
assignment, or other disposition of any patent be evidenced by an instrument in writing
and that the same be required of any condition, agreement, or undertaking relating to any
sale or disposition of any such patent; and that in any such case a copy of such written
instrument be filed with the Federal Trade Commission within 30 days after execution.
TNEC FINAL REPORT, supra note 75, at 37.
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manage price-fixing cartels. In modern enforcement practice and scholarly debate about
antitrust policy, patent licensing practices have received comparatively little attention as
instruments of cartel management. Compared to other possible focal points for anti-cartel
enforcement, patent licensing arrangements can create difficult analytical complexities. A
lesson from the earlier generations of antitrust-patent cases is that the use of patents by
alleged price-fixers is often abstruse. Enforcers and courts may need to work harder to
understand the technology, patent practices, and industry context specific to a case. 183 As
it is, enforcement is often a demanding endeavor in terms of resources, time, and expertise
needed to prosecute a case. 184 It is a daunting challenge for an enforcement agency to
assemble a narrative that gives a court confidence that anticompetitive effects predominate
in the face of benign or procompetitive effects often associated with patent licenses. In
short, cases at the intersection of antitrust and patent law can be intimidating, and it takes
a patient, determined, and properly resourced government prosecutor to execute them
successfully.
We believe the gains from focusing greater attention on patent licensing warrant the
effort to deal with the analytical complexities. Licensing arrangements can provide
attractive means for serial colluders to cloak illegal collaboration under the guise of

183

Till, supra note 5, at 309–310:

While patent licensing arrangements are theoretically preferable to pure monopoly
situations, often these agreements contain provisions designed to restrict competition.
Increasingly these arrangements have become more sophisticated as the Justice
Department’s Antitrust Division has sought to confine the exercise of monopoly to the
patent itself. In this effort, the government has generally secured the support of the courts.
But the cases instituted by the Department of Justice have involved only a small number
of industries. It is therefore impossible to say whether, in the many not investigated, blatant
restrictions are still fully spelled out in licensing arrangements or whether they have simply
been driven underground. In both cases, a comprehension of the restrictions contained in a
license agreement requires knowledge, often extensive knowledge, of the operation of the
industry and its trade practices.
184

See Priest, supra note 6, at 365:

The problem of detecting illegitimate arrangements . . . is more difficult than merely
identifying those particular practices that might be employed by both cartels and patent
licensors. . . . The most telling example is where a group of firms appoints a licensor and,
foregoing explicit price, output, or territorial restrictions, authorizes the licensor to charge each
member firm a royalty with the understanding that at later date the royalties exacted will be
rebated in full. It would be impossible to detect a cartel agreement of this nature without a
detailed investigation into the relationships between the licensees and the licensor, because the
behavior of each licensee will appear irreproachable; each can set price exactly equal to its
apparent marginal cost which will include the royalty.
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seemingly legitimate activity, in which direct interaction among competing firms might
seem normal and unremarkable from an antitrust standpoint. As antitrust systems seek to
deter collusion through more powerful detection mechanisms and stronger sanctions, one
cannot underestimate the ingenuity and perseverance that producers will deploy to devise
counter measures and strategies that permit the accomplishment of their collusive
objectives. Licensing arrangements that are either invisible to external observers or seem
innocuous at first glance can provide means to this end.
We also believe the burdens associated with the analysis suggested here may be
manageable. There are opportunities today for the antitrust enforcement community,
especially U.S. enforcement agencies, to apply the substantial body of learning that they
have accumulated regarding the operation of the intellectual property system and the use
of patents in commerce. Intensified examination of the possibilities for patent licensing to
facilitate coordination by serial colluders would build upon a significant foundation of
enforcement experience and research. Such a program would complement other major
efforts to apply competition policy to high technology sectors and industries that rely
heavily upon the application of patents and other intellectual property rights.
For roughly half a century, from the 1920s through the 1970s, U.S. antitrust policy
adopted a highly skeptical view of many patent licensing practices. This skepticism has
attenuated over the past forty years, as antitrust enforcement agencies and courts disavowed
the hostility toward the same doctrines and enforcement policy statements. The rebalancing
that has taken place ought not to obscure the fact that some of the concerns of the
enforcement community were not illusory. Our proposals seek to give effect to the sound
understandings of the earlier era and bring the force of modern learning to bear upon the
special problem of serial collusion.

Appendix A
EC Chemical Product Decisions and Cartel Firms

64

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3863378

1. Bitumen: Case COMP / 38.456 – Bitumen - NL, September 13, 2006
a. Shell
2. Butadiene Rubber: Case COMP/F/38.638 – Butadiene Rubber and Emulsion
Styrene Butadiene Rubber, November 29, 2006
a. Bayer, Shell
3. Calcium Carbide: Case COMP/39.396 – Calcium carbide and magnesium based
reagents for the steel and gas industries, July 22, 2009
a. Akzo Nobel, Degussa
4. Candle Waxes: Case COMP/39181 – Candle Waxes, October 1, 2008
a. Shell
5. *Cartonboard: IV/C/33.833 - Cartonboard, July 13, 1994
a. Fides/AC Treuhand
6. Chloroprene Rubber: COMP/38629 - Chloroprene Rubber, December 5, 2007
a. Bayer
7. Choline Chloride: Case COMP/E-2/37.533 – Choline Chloride, Comm’n
Decision, December 9, 2004
a. Akzo Nobel, BASF
8. Citric Acid: Case COMP/E-1/36.604 – Citric Acid, Comm’n Decision, 2002
O.J.(L239) 18. December 5, 2001
a. Bayer
9. *Fatty Acids: IV/31.128 — Fatty Acids, Comm'n Decision, December 2, 1986
a. Fides/AC Treuhand
10. Food Flavor Enhancers: Case COMP/C.37.671 – Flood Flavour Enhancers,
Comm’n Decision 2004 (L 75) December 17, 2002
a. <None from those listed in Figure 5>
11. Heat Stabilizers: COMP/38589 – Heat Stablisers, November 11, 2009
a. Akzo Nobel, Arkema/ Atofina, Elf Aquitaine, Fides/AC Treuhand
12. *Hydrogen Peroxide: IV/30.907 — Peroxygen products, November 23, 1984
a. Atochem, Solvay, Degussa
13. Hydrogen Peroxide: Case COMP/F/38.620 – Hydrogen Peroxide and Perborate,
May 3, 2006
a. Akzo Nobel, Arkema/Atofina, Degussa, Elf Aquitaine, Solvay
14. Lysine: Case COMP/36.545/F3. Amino Acids, June 7, 2000
a. <None from those listed in Figure 5>
15. Methacrylates: Case No COMP/F/38.645 — Methacrylates, May 31, 2006
a. Arkema/Atofina, Degussa, ICI, Elf Aquitaine
16. Methionine: Case C.37.519 – Methionine, Comm’n Decision, 2002 (L 255) 1.
July 2, 2002
a. Degussa, Rhone Poulenc/Aventis
17. Methyglucamine: Case COMP/E-2/37.978 – Methylglucamine, Comm’n
Decision, November 27, 2002
a. Rhone Poulenc/Aventis
18. Monochloroacetic Acid: Case COMP/E-1/.37.773– MCAA, Comm’n Decision,
January 19, 2005
a. Akzo Nobel, Arkema/Atofina, Elf Aquitaine, Fides/AC Treuhand, Hoechst

65

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3863378

19. Organic Peroxides: Case COMP/E-2/37.857 – Organic Peroxyde, Comm’n
Decision, December 10, 2003
a. Akzo Nobel, Arkema/Atofina, Degussa, Fides/AC Treuhand,
20. *Polyethylene: IV/31.866, LdPE, December 21, 1988
a. Atochem, BASF, Bayer, Dow, Enichem, Fides/AC Treuhand, Hoechst,
ICI, Repsol, Shell
21. *Polypropylene: IV/31.149 – Polypropylene, April 23, 1986
a. Atochem, BASF, Fides/AC Treuhand, Hoechst, ICI, Rhone
Poulenc/Aventis, Shell, Solvay
22. *Potash: IV/795 – Kaliand Salz/Kali Chemie, December 21, 1973
a. BASF, Solvay
23. *PVC: IV/31.865, PVC, December 21, 1988
a. Atochem, BASF, Enichem, Fides/AC Treuhand, Hoechst, ICI, Shell,
Solvay
24. Rubber Chemicals: Case COMP/F/38.443 – Rubber Chemicals, Comm’n
Decision December 21, 2005 (summary at 2006 (L 353) 50)
a. Akzo Nobel (through Flexsys) 185, Bayer
25. *Soda Ash: Case COMP/33.133-B: Soda-ash, December 19, 1990
a. BASF, Solvay
26. Sodium Chlorate: Case COMP/38.695 – Sodium Chlorate, June 11, 2008
a. Akzo Nobel, Arkema/Atofina, Elf Aquitaine
27. Sodium Gluconate: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-011355_en.htm?locale=en#file.tmp_Foot_1, March 19, 2002
a. Akzo Nobel
28. Sorbates: Case COMP/E-1/37.370 – Sorbates, Comm’n Decision October 1, 2003
a. Hoechst
29. *Synthetic Fibers: IV/30.810 - Synthetic fibres, July 4, 1984
a. Bayer, Hoechst, ICI, Rhone Poulenc/Aventis
30. Vitamins: Case COMP/E-1/37.512– Vitamins, Comm’n Decision, 2001 O.J. (L6)
November 21, 2001
a. BASF, Rhone Poulenc/Aventis, Solvay
31. *Woodpulp: IV/29.725 - Wood pulp, December 19, 1984
a. Fides/AC Treuhand
32. Nitrile Butadiene Rubber: COMP/38.628 - Nitrile Butadiene Rubber, January 23,
2008
a. Bayer

185

See the cited EC decision at para 13, “The holding company for Flexsys is Flexsys Holding B.V. of which
Akzo Nobel Chemicals International B.V. holds 50%, the remaining 50% being held by Solutia Inc and
Solutia Europe N.V. together.”
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Appendix B 186
I.

GOOGLE PATENTS ADVANCED SEARCH INSTRUCTIONS

FIELD
Synonym

INPUT
CL=“[product keyword]”
Product keywords are listed below (see “Product Keywords” section)
Claims search (CL=):

▪
▪

Restricts search to claims of patents
Increases relevance of resulting patents by limiting results to patents in
which the product is a notable input or process patents for the product

Note:

▪
▪

Date

To search the union of multiple search terms, separate each “synonym”
with OR
To search the intersection of multiple search terms, separate each
“synonym” with AND

Choose “filing” from the dropdown list
Enter years from January 1 to January 1 of the next year (i.e. 1984-01-01 – 1985-0101)
Note:

▪
▪
▪

Inventor
Assignee

Leave blank
Firm search terms, university search terms (see “Assignee Search Terms” below)
Note:

▪
▪

Patent Office
Language
Status
Type
Sort by

Pre-plea years: 10 years prior to the start of the earliest starting year of
a firm’s plea period in the corresponding EC decision
Plea years: the earliest starting year of a firm’s plea period in the
corresponding EC decision to the latest ending year of a firm’s plea
period in the corresponding EC decision
Post-plea years: 10 years after the latest ending year of a firm’s plea
period in the corresponding EC decision

To search the union of multiple search terms, separate each “synonym”
with OR
To search the intersection of multiple search terms, separate each
“synonym” with AND

Do not change (this generates a global search)
Do not change
Choose “grant” from the dropdown list
Choose “patent” from the dropdown list
Relevance
Note: This option can be changed only after the search results are displayed.

186

This Appendix was prepared by our three research assistants: Katherine Bartuska, Naira Batoyan, and
Hope Bodenschatz, at the direction of the authors of the paper. Any errors are the responsibility of the
authors of the paper.
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II.

PRODUCT SELECTION

Focusing on the firms of Akzo, BASF, Bayer, Solvay, and Degussa as producers and
non-producers, if the pre-plea or the plea period has more than an average of two patents
per year than chemical product was included. Otherwise, the product was excluded.
III.

PRODUCT KEYWORDS

PRODUCT
1. Bitumen
2. Butadiene Rubber
4. Candle Wax

SEARCH TERM(S)
“bitumen”
“butadiene rubber” OR “polybutadiene”
“candle waxes” OR “paraffin waxes” OR “slack waxes” OR
“candle wax” OR “paraffin wax” OR “slack wax”

6. Chloroprene Rubber

“chloroprene rubber” OR “chlorobutadiene rubber” OR
“polychloroprene” OR “neoprene”

8. Citric Acid
11. Heat Stabilizers

“citric acid”
“heat stabilizers” OR “heat stabilizer” OR “heat stabilisers” OR
“heat stabiliser” OR “thermal stabilizers” OR “thermal stabilizer”
OR “thermal stabilisers” OR “thermal stabiliser” OR “tin
stabilizers” OR “tin stabilizer” OR “tin stabilisers” OR “tin
stabiliser” OR “epoxidised soybean oil” OR “epoxidized soybean
oil” OR “ESBO”

12. Hydrogen Peroxide 1984

“hydrogen peroxide” OR “hydrogen peroxides” OR “sodium
perborate”

13. Hydrogen Peroxide 2006

“hydrogen peroxide” OR “hydrogen peroxides” OR “sodium
perborate”

15. Methacrylates
16. Methionine
17. Methylglucamine
18. Monochloroacetic Acid
(MCAA)
19. Organic Peroxides

“methacrylates” OR “methacrylate”
“methionine”
“methylglucamine” OR “meglumine”
“monochloroacetic acid” OR “MCAA” OR “sodium
monochloroacetate” OR “SMCA”
“peroxides” OR “peroxide” OR “peroxy” AND –hydrogen
Note: when performing a claims search, do not use CL= before
-hydrogen
“polyethylene” OR “LdPE”
“polypropylene” OR “polypropene”
“PVC” OR “polyvinyl chloride”
“anti-degradants” OR “anti-degradant” OR “antidegradants” OR
“antidegradant” OR “accelerators” OR “accelerator” OR “rubber
chemicals” OR “rubber chemical” OR “antioxidants” OR
“antioxidant” OR “antiozonants” OR “antiozonant” OR “retarder”
OR “retarders” OR “peptizer” OR “peptizers”

20. Polyethylene
21. Polypropylene
23. PVC
24. Rubber Chemicals

25. Soda Ash

“sodium carbonate” OR “soda ash”
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29. Synthetic Fibers

“polyamide textile yarn” OR “polyamide carpet yarn” OR
“polyester textile yarn” OR “polyamide staple” OR “polyester
staple” OR “acrylic staple” OR “synthetic fibers” OR “synthetic
fibres” OR “synthetic fiber” OR “synthetic fibre”

30. Vitamins

“vitamin A” OR “vitamin C” OR “ascorbic acid” OR “vitamin E”
OR “vitamin B” OR “thiamine” OR “riboflavin” OR “calpan”
“nitrile butadiene rubber” OR “nitrile rubber” OR “acrylonitrile
butadiene rubber”

32. Nitrile Butadiene Rubber

IV.

ASSIGNEE SEARCH TERMS

Assignee names to be used in all cases, with the exception of the outstanding mergers,
acquisitions, and name changes listed below.
Akzo Nobel

Atochem / Atofina /
Arkema*
Degussa
Shell

Bayer
Rhone Poulenc

Aventis

BASF

Hoechst
Solvay

ICI

*see Mergers, Acquisitions, and Name Changes below
V.

MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND NAME CHANGES – ALL SEARCHES

These cases are relevant in all instances, even when the firms are not in the cartel.
FIRM
Akzo Nobel
Atochem / Atofina /
Arkema
Bayer
Hoechst / Rhone
Poulenc / Aventis

VI.

SEARCH
Start year – 1993
Akzo OR Nobel
1994 – end year
Akzo Nobel
Start year – 1999
Atochem
2000 – 2003
Atochem OR Atofina
2004 – end year
Atochem OR Atofina OR Arkema
Start year – 2003
Bayer
2004
Bayer OR Lanxess
2005
Bayer
Search the relevant firms in separate columns for entire time period

MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND NAME CHANGES – CASE SPECIFIC
FOR CARTEL MEMBERS

CARTEL

FIRM

3. Calcium Carbide

Degussa

8. Citric Acid

Bayer

12. Hydrogen Peroxide
1984

Atochem /
Atofina /
Arkema

SEARCH
1994 – 2003
2004 – 2006
1981 – 2003
2004
2005
1948 – 1982
1983 – 1990

Degussa OR SKW
Degussa OR SKW OR Alzchem Hart
Bayer OR Haarman & Reimer
Bayer OR Haarman & Reimer OR Lanxess
Bayer OR Haarman & Reimer
Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann
Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann OR Atochem
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13. Hydrogen Peroxide
2006

Akzo
Nobel
Solvay

19. Organic Peroxide

Atochem /
Atofina /
Arkema

20. Polyethylene

Atochem /
Atofina /
Arkema

21. Polypropylene

Atochem /
Atofina /
Arkema

24. Rubber Chemicals

Akzo
Nobel and
Flexsys

25. Soda Ash

Solvay

26. Sodium Chlorate

Akzo
Nobel

1948 – 1985
1986 – 1993
1994 – 2010
1984 – 2001
2002 – 2010
1961 – 1982
1983 – 1999
2000 – 2003
2004 – 2009
1966 – 1982
1983
1984 – 1994
1966 – 1982

Akzo OR Nobel
Akzo OR Nobel OR Eka
Akzo Nobel OR Eka
Solvay
Solvay OR Ausimont
Pennwalt OR Luperox
Pennwalt OR Luperox OR Atochem
Pennwalt OR Luperox OR Atochem OR
Atofina
Pennwalt OR Luperox OR Atochem OR
Atofina OR Arkema
Aquitaine Total Organico
Aquitaine Total Organico OR Atochem
Atochem
Aquitaine Total Organico

1983
1984 – 1993
1986 – 2011

Aquitaine Total Organico OR Atochem
Atochem
Akzo Nobel and Flexsys are searched
separately and placed in separate columns

1977 – 1985
1986 – 2000
1984 – 1985

Kali Chemie OR Solvay
Solvay
Elektrokemiska Aktiebolaget OR Akzo OR
Nobel
Elektrokemiska Aktiebolaget OR Eka OR
Akzo OR Nobel
Eka OR Akzo OR Nobel
Eka OR Akzo Nobel

1986
1987 – 1993
1994 - 2010
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